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Feminist legal theorists have devoted enormous attention to conceptualizing the
issues of sex work and trafficking for sexual purposes. While these theories vary,
they typically fall into one of two camps. The abolitionist perspective, having
grown out of dominance feminist theory, perceives sex work as inherently
exploitative. In contrast, a second group of theorists adopts a liberal notion of
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individual choice and draws on the poststructuralist rejection of gender
essentialism to envision a theoretical model of sex-worker rights. The legal and
public policies that grow from these two models are similarly polarized. Radical
feminist abolitionists are often strange bedfellows with evangelical Christian
organizations, working to end all sex work by rescuing women, regardless of any
individual volition exercised in choosing the profession. On the other hand,
organizations focused on sex-worker rights seek to help sex workers take care of
themselves without fully questioning the social circumstances that lead women to
make such a choice.
This Article proposes a new theoretical model of trafficking for sexual purposes:
a third-way feminist account of sex trafficking. Leveraging the feminist literature
on constrained autonomy, the author draws on her own experience working with
trafficked African and Asian populations to offer this new approach. This model
relies on the dominance feminist critique of social conditions generative of
women’s economic desperation, which often underlies women’s choice to engage in
sexual labor. At the same time, the author rejects gender essentialism and endorses
a liberal notion of the individual woman as an actor with real, though constrained,
personal autonomy. Having explored this theoretical model, the Article identifies a
series of interventions in trafficking for sexual purposes that recognize the
individual and her personal resources while ultimately seeking to further her own
autonomy.
In proposing these interventions, this Article directly offers a vision of how
feminist legal theory can work to alleviate poverty and other social barriers that
third-world women encounter in trying to support themselves and their families.
Finally, the Article closes with a consideration of the relationship between the
author’s proposed third-way feminist model and the international development
literature on the capabilities approach. The interventions that arise from this thirdway conception of feminist theory complement the capabilities model of
development, as both seek to broaden the individual’s life options in pursuit of a
more robust individual agency.
INTRODUCTION
In May 2003, law enforcement officers raided a brothel in Chiang Mai, the
capital of the northern region of Thailand and the regional center for the many
indigenous peoples or hill tribes that populate the surrounding mountains.1 They
conducted this raid at the behest of a coalition of Thai non-governmental
organizations and an American evangelical Christian organization.2 The American
organization, with funding from the U.S. government and in conjunction with the
Thai non-governmental organizations, was dedicated to investigating and reporting
brothels with children inside to the authorities, and tried to persuade the police to

1. This raid is well documented in the popular press, even in the United States. See,
e.g., Noy Thrupkaew, The Crusade Against Sex Trafficking: Do Brothel Raids Help or Hurt
the ‘Rescued’?, NATION, Oct. 5, 2009, at 12, 15–16.
2. The International Justice Mission (IJM) is an evangelical human rights organization
that works extensively on trafficking issues in the sex industry. IJM’s involvement in this
raid is known and documented. See id. at 14.
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shut down such locales.3 The particular brothel raided in this story was a brothel
like many others in the country, filled with ethnically Shan women from Burma.4
Most of the women were of the age of majority, but while accounts vary, some
organizations asserted that there were teenagers working in the brothel as well.5
How these teenagers reached the brothel is unclear; the organizations claiming that
teenage girls were there also asserted that the girls’ presence could not be voluntary
due to their age and that the girls were victims of human trafficking.6
The coalition of organizations effected what they termed a “rescue” of the
women in the brothel because of the believed presence of children.7 What followed
was a human rights debacle. Twenty-eight women and girls, most of whom were,
by all accounts, adults, were involuntarily detained beyond the period of time that
victims of trafficking may be confined under Thai law. They were not arrested or
charged with crimes, but detained, according to the authorities, because they had
been rescued from a situation of human trafficking. They were deprived of access

3. Gary A. Haugen, the founder of IJM, has published a book that explains the
philosophy and theology behind the work of IJM. GARY A. HAUGEN, GOOD NEWS ABOUT
INJUSTICE: A WITNESS OF COURAGE IN A HURTING WORLD (1999).
4. See Thrupkaew, supra note 1, at 14.
5. Id.
6. Id. International law defines trafficking as
the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by
means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of
fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of
the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a
person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.
Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of
others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery
or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (Nov. 15, 2000) [hereinafter Trafficking
Protocol].
7. While this raid has been discussed in the popular press, the account contained in the
next five paragraphs summarizes my own conversations during the summer of 2003, which I
spent traveling throughout Thailand as an interested movement participant. As I was in
Thailand as a fellow social services worker who had provided assistance to trafficked
women in Italy, my methodology was an informal snowball sampling approach: I
interviewed trafficked women, former sex workers, and myriad social services providers, all
with the goal of developing a broader understanding of the trafficking phenomenon on the
ground in Thailand. While it is of course the case that cultural and linguistic gaps imposed
significant limitations on my research, and I do not believe that my position as an outsider
gave me an objective vantage point, I also believe that I, as a Westerner, had access to
locations, individuals, and conversations that a Thai researcher could not have gained. In this
regard, I wholeheartedly agree with Martha Nussbaum’s assessment of her own work in
India: “In a situation of entrenched inequality, being a neighbor can be an epistemological
problem.” MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 10 (2000). Simply
stated, being an outsider gave me entrée to situations that neighbors could not have gained. I
remain profoundly grateful for the way that the trafficked women, former sex workers, and
social services providers shared their stories with me.
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to their belongings and saved earnings, which were locked inside the inaccessible
brothel under police control; they never regained ownership of these possessions.
After a lengthy period of time, the government deported many of these women to
Burma. All of these actions, which the women experienced as both harmful and
alienating, occurred under the guise of rescuing them from the brothel in which
they worked.
According to social services workers who interviewed four women who escaped
from the brothel as the police arrived, all of the women were ethnic Shan from
Burma and were at least nineteen years of age at the time of the raid.8 Prior to
immigrating to Thailand, their status as members of the Burmese Shan indigenous
group rendered these women subject to summary detention and rape at any time at
the hands of officers of the Burmese junta.9 Faced with the option of abuse by the
authorities in a region of Burma overwhelmed by poverty, many Shan women
chose, and continue to choose, to cross the mountains that demarcate the ThaiBurma border and move to a Thai city to work in a brothel.10 This choice has a
certain logic, as forced labor, forced relocations, and food shortages remain an
endemic problem in Burma.11 For many, work in a Thai brothel presented the
opportunity to escape the repression of the Burmese junta and to send adequate
money home in order to support families, educate children, and maintain

8. The relationship of the Burmese government, which is comprised primarily of ethnic
Burmans, and the Shan ethnic group is a complex one that is not truly monolithic; the details
of this relationship are unimportant to the topic at hand. In short, the Shan are an ethnic
minority that the junta targets for particularized forms of oppression. See, e.g., HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, NO SAFETY IN BURMA, NO SANCTUARY IN THAILAND pt. 4 (1997), available
at
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/1997/07/01/no-safety-burma-no-sanctuarythailand;
MARTIN SMITH, MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP INT’L, BURMA (MYANMAR): THE TIME FOR
CHANGE 19–20 (2002), available at http://www.minorityrights.org/1022/reports/burmamyanmar-time-for-change.html; Burma “Terrorising Ethnic Minorities,” BBC NEWS
WORLD EDITION (July 17, 2002, 06:49 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/2132986.stm.
9. THE SHAN HUMAN RIGHTS FOUND. (SHRF) & THE SHAN WOMEN’S ACTION
NETWORK (SWAN), LICENSE TO RAPE: THE BURMESE MILITARY REGIME’S USE OF SEXUAL
VIOLENCE IN THE ONGOING WAR IN SHAN STATE (2002), available at
http://www.burmacampaign.org.uk/reports/License_to_rape.pdf (documenting the use of
rape as a weapon of war in Shan State); see also THE KAREN WOMEN’S ORG., STATE OF
TERROR: THE ONGOING RAPE, MURDER, TORTURE AND FORCED LABOUR SUFFERED BY
WOMEN LIVING UNDER THE BURMESE MILITARY REGIME IN KAREN STATE (2007), available
at
http://www.womenofburma.org/Statement&Release/state_of_terror_report.pdf
(documenting sexual violence against women in Karen State, the home of another
indigenous population in Burma).
10. SMITH, supra note 8, at 20 (“As a result [of ethnic tensions and conflict], despite the
spread of ceasefires, by the turn of the century the humanitarian crisis was extreme in several
border areas. In addition to illicit drug production, there were large numbers of internally
displaced persons, as well as thousands of women going into prostitution in Thailand.”).
11. The Burmese military has made a policy of denying food supplies to ethnic regions
and of forcing relocations and labor within these areas. Civilians are commonly compelled to
serve as military porters or to sweep routes for mines in advance of troops. THE KAREN
WOMEN’S ORG., supra note 9, at 9, 12.
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households. From the perspective of these women, that they at times paid people to
facilitate their passage to Thailand was merely incidental.
Further, the women who escaped the brothel prior to the raid claimed that they,
like the women “rescued” in this particular scenario, and like many other Shan sex
workers in Thailand, worked in the brothel of their own volition. According to
these women, they were free to come and go as they liked; they were not subject to
physical restraint in any way. They were not in debt bondage in the traditional
sense of the phrase, although some did at times take pay advances from the brothel
manager to travel home and back; they would repay such advances with a portion
of their earnings over time, much like a loan against future paychecks that some
workplaces offer in the United States. Yet from the perspective of the American
evangelical organization doing this work, the women in the brothel, particularly the
minors, needed to be rescued from the brothel. According to the IJM employee
with whom I spoke during the summer following the raid, as all of the women had
traveled across borders and left their communities to work in the sex industry, they
qualified as exploited women in need of assistance, even when they personally
denied that they experienced harm in the brothels.12 That they may have paid others
to facilitate their migration was presented as further evidence of their exploitation.
Nearly every anti-trafficking organization in Thailand had a different
perspective on this situation. The explicitly feminist organizations unanimously
supported the women, organizing letter-writing campaigns decrying the treatment
of these detained sex workers and writing scathing white papers to bring public
attention to the situation.13 The Western evangelical organization that initiated the
raid on the basis of their own brothel research claimed that they had orchestrated
the rescue because two or three children were trapped against their will in the
brothel.14 It was only in my interview of a Thai-European man who worked
extensively in anti-trafficking efforts that I came to appreciate the complexity of the
situation surrounding this particular raid. He identified the myriad perspectives
from which individuals and organizations perceived trafficking for sexual purposes
and tried, in the context of his work, to maintain good working rapport with all of
the local groups. In listening to him describe this working style, it became apparent
to me that the raid and its aftermath crystallized the difficulty he encountered in
working with organizations that shared no common ground in their approaches to
trafficking. Although his approach was no more objectively correct than the others,

12. Thrupkaew likewise reports that adults were removed from the brothel in question
and indicates that they were deported. Thrupkaew, supra note 1, at 14. However, during
the controversy that followed Thrupkaew’s article, IJM placed the following statement on its
website as part of a letter to the editor submitted to The Nation: “In more than 10 years of
experience on the frontlines of this field, IJM has found that effective policing can be done
without infringing on the rights of adult women voluntarily engaging in commercial sex.”
IJM Letters to the Editor of The Nation, INT’L JUSTICE MISSION,
http://www.ijm.org/ijmnews/nationletterstoeditor.
13. While I observed this firsthand, Thrupkaew, supra note 1, at 13–14, offers further
confirmation of this observation.
14. Again, this observation is based on my own interviews and confirmed by
Thrupkaew. Id.
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his appreciation of the conflict helped frame for me the questions that animate this
Article.
I do not claim to know all of the nuances of this particular story, and I do not
narrate it as authoritative. But the fallout from this raid has haunted me since that
time because it illustrates and exemplifies the ongoing ideological conflict that
surrounds the trafficking of women for sexual purposes.15 A lack of shared
dialogue among organizations typifies the anti-trafficking movement, in Thailand
and elsewhere.16 Rather than coordinating efforts by reaching consensus on at least
some shared goals, these groups constantly argued among themselves about the
most basic of concerns and, therefore, could not even broach harder topics.17 This
particular raid highlighted the extent of disagreement over what could be proper
interventions and, even more problematically, over who required rescue. The
organizations never reached agreement on the deeper issues such as the dilemma of
brothels, when or whether the rescue of adult women is appropriate, or the essential

15. Trafficking does not occur only in the sex trade. Agriculture, food processing,
manufacturing, domestic labor, public works, and fishing are all industries in which
trafficking has been documented. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 24,
36, 47 (2009). However, despite the fact that women are particularly susceptible to
trafficking due to employers’ beliefs that female laborers are “submissive, cheap, and
pliable,” id., scholars and activists have reported that the U.S. government overreports sex
trafficking and underreports trafficking into other labor sectors. Grace Chang & Kathleen
Kim, Reconceptualizing Approaches to Human Trafficking: New Directions and
Perspectives from the Field(s), 3 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 317, 324–25 (2007) (observing that
while the government reports over two-thirds of trafficking cases to be sex trafficking, one
service provider in Los Angeles reported 40% domestic work, 17% factory work, 17% sex
work, 13% restaurant work, and 13% servile marriage). I too have written about this problem
elsewhere. Shelley Cavalieri, The Eyes That Blind Us: The Overlooked Phenomenon of
Trafficking into the Agricultural Sector, 31 N. ILL. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (proposing
explanations for why trafficking for sex work is the primary focus of public discourse,
suggesting why trafficking into agriculture is particularly overlooked, and proposing policy
interventions to shift attention to trafficking in agriculture). Likewise, trafficking of minors,
whether into sex work or any other industry, raises a whole separate set of issues, as
children’s capacity for consent obviously differs from that of women, but what qualifies as a
child likewise varies from country to country. See Jyoti Sanghera, Unpacking the Trafficking
Discourse, in TRAFFICKING AND PROSTITUTION RECONSIDERED: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON
MIGRATION, SEX WORK AND HUMAN RIGHTS 3, 13 (Kamala Kempadoo ed., 2005). While all
of these concerns about trafficking are critical, they are also outside the scope of this Article.
16. The lack of reliable data also hinders efforts to prevent trafficking and address its
effects on trafficked persons. The incidence of human trafficking remains difficult to
quantify due to the fact that trafficked persons in all labor sectors remain hidden populations
who are engaged in stigmatized and illegal behavior, who are difficult to locate, and who
may refuse to cooperate in research or give “unreliable answers to protect their privacy.”
Guri Tyldum & Anette Brunovskis, Describing the Unobserved: Methodological Challenges
in Empirical Studies on Human Trafficking, in DATA AND RESEARCH ON HUMAN
TRAFFICKING: A GLOBAL SURVEY 17, 18 (Frank Laczko & Elzbieta Gozdziak eds., 2005).
17. Again, this observation is based on my own interviews and confirmed by
Thrupkaew, supra note 1, at 14, who notes that “[e]ven the other anti-trafficking groups
couldn’t get along with [the evangelical organization].” That conflict existed between these
groups is well documented.
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acceptability of sex work. This raid demonstrated that the organizations simply
could not agree on how to engage with the problem, much less on any shared
ideological premises from which to coordinate their efforts.18 In the absence of
coordinated anti-trafficking efforts, these organizations wasted enormous amounts
of time infighting rather than providing direct assistance to the myriad trafficked
and voluntary sex workers in Thailand who might have benefited from social
services aid.19
From a theoretical perspective, this Thai scenario displays the ideological chasm
that divides anti-trafficking organizations. Whereas in this particular scenario the
abolitionist organization was evangelical Christian, a number of feminist groups
also share abolitionist values.20 Although their first principles differ dramatically,
both kinds of abolitionist organizations hold in common a fundamental instinct that
consent to the sale of sexual labor is problematic. Beginning from this premise,
feminist abolitionist organizations articulate a gender-based critique of the social
conditions that create the economic desperation underlying women’s choice to
engage in sexual labor.21 Further, they advocate the ultimate abolition of all forms
of sexual labor as the solution to the coercive choice of engagement in sex work.22
Yet as they cannot fully explain the private choices that individual women make in
the context of conditions of social oppression and economic desperation, their
account offers a narrow critique focused solely on the sexuality inherent in the
labor, without acknowledging the other aspects of women’s lives that shaped their
choices to perform sexual labor.
The sex-worker-rights organizations examined the raid from the opposite
perspective. Beginning with an initial reliance on the concept of self-determination,
these organizations asserted that the women in the brothel had chosen to be there
and that the raid’s forcible removal of them was a fundamentally unacceptable
abridgement of their autonomy. As the women worked of their own volition, were
free to stay or leave, and were not in debt bondage, the conditions of their work
were consistent with their autonomy. Further, the sex-worker-rights organizations
emphasized the particularized context of these women’s choices. Faced with the
option of sexual abuse and hunger at the hands of the Burmese junta, these
organizations asserted that the choice to live and work in a brothel was a rational

18. The same conflict has been identified in on-the-ground intervention in sex work and
trafficking in other contexts as well. See, e.g., MEREDITH RALSTON & EDNA KEEBLE,
RELUCTANT BEDFELLOWS: FEMINISM, ACTIVISM AND PROSTITUTION IN THE PHILIPPINES 52–62
(2009).
19. See Thrupkaew, supra note 1, at 15 (discussing how sex-worker-rights organizations
would help women avoid raids and deal with their aftermath).
20. The Coalition Against Trafficking in Women (CATW), discussed infra Part I, is the
most notable of the feminist anti-prostitution organizations. CATW’s mission statement
begins with the following paragraph: “The Coalition Against Trafficking in Women
(CATW) is a non-governmental organization that promotes women’s human rights. It works
internationally to combat sexual exploitation in all its forms, especially prostitution and
trafficking in women and children, in particular girls.” An Introduction to CATW, COAL.
AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN, http://www.catwinternational.org/about/index.php.
21. See infra Part I.
22. See infra Part I.
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decision that individuals made based on the circumstances of their lives in Burma.23
However, by framing brothel work as a series of individual decisions, these groups
overlooked the social influences that constrained the range of options available to
women who chose to engage in sexual labor.
These practical, activist positions on trafficking share important connections to
the strains of feminist theory that provide their underlying rationales.24 The
abolitionist movement is closely tied to the dominance feminism school of thought,
paradigmatically defined by the work of Catharine MacKinnon.25 In the context of
sex work generally and trafficking specifically, Kathleen Barry and others have
articulated the nuances of the application of the dominance feminism model to this
issue.26 Other feminist authors, notably Jo Doezema and Kamala Kempadoo,
discuss the sex-worker-rights position, which possesses two sets of roots. First, it
arises in significant part from a liberal vision of trafficking and its critique of
dominance feminist theory.27 Second, in important and largely unstated ways, it
draws on poststructuralist feminism’s rejection of gender essentialism.28 Martha
Nussbaum also offers an explicitly liberal vision of trafficking and sex work from a
more specifically philosophical position.29
The weaknesses and strengths of these strains of feminist theory closely parallel
the problems articulated above regarding approaches to sex trafficking. The
dominance school of feminism brilliantly offers a scathing critique of gender and
sexualized privilege in society, and at times extends the critique equally well to the
arenas of first-world privilege. Yet dominance feminism provides this critique in
such a universalized way that it fails to account for the individual circumstances of
particular women’s lives. In short, dominance feminism extends its critique too far,
compulsorily drawing all women into its purview, and offering abolition as its
singular solution predicated solely on a stunted view of trafficking. Feminists
focused on sex-worker rights, in contrast, insightfully leverage liberal thought to
appreciate the condition of individual women’s lives and place women’s decisions
within a personal context; they look to poststructuralism30 to help construct a

23. Even a former staffer of the IJM has noted that the women “were making a rational
decision under horrible conditions—to be raped for free in Burma or paid to do commercial
sex work is one situation. For me, they are making a rational decision, but that’s a decision
no one should have to make.” Thrupkaew, supra note 1, at 16 (quoting Christa Crawford,
former IJM country director in Thailand).
24. Chantal Thomas has discussed these two general camps in her considerations of
governance feminism and sex trafficking. Janet Halley, Prabha Kotiswaran, Hila Shamir &
Chantal Thomas, From the International to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape,
Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary Governance
Feminism, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 335, 348–51 (2006).
25. See infra Part I.
26. See infra Part I.
27. See infra notes 88–95 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 96–98 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 148–60 and accompanying text.
30. Poststructuralism “emphasizes the variety, complexity, and contingency of the
discursive influences that shape subject formation.” Kathryn Abrams, Afterword, Critical
Strategy and the Judicial Evasion of Difference, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1426, 1437 n.52
(2000). Put another way, poststructuralism rejects a monolithic account of a group and
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feminism cognizant of individual difference. But they neglect the broader social
context in which individual women make private life choices, which is a crucial
element of a feminist social critique.
This Article articulates a new feminist approach to the trafficking of women for
sexual purposes. Drawing on existing feminist scholarship that both appreciates the
constrained autonomy within which individuals make decisions and proffers a more
generalized condemnation of patriarchal social structures, this project enlists both
dominance and liberal feminism to stake out a middle ground—a third way—
between the poles of victimhood and agency.31 Rather than focusing on the
ideological battle over women’s bodies as represented in the trafficking and sex
work debates, this Article offers a new model that properly conceptualizes
trafficked women and voluntary transnational sex workers and highlights
preventative and interventionist approaches consistent with this vision of who these
women are. While focusing on trafficking for sex work because of the generative
force of feminist legal theory, these interventions are equally useful in addressing
trafficking into any labor sector.32
Part I lays out the dominance feminist approach to sex work in general, and
trafficking specifically, offering a critique of the weaknesses of this approach. This
Part simultaneously identifies the strands of this line of theorizing that might be
salvaged to offer an alternative to the existing bifurcated approach to trafficking.
Part II similarly articulates the main arguments of sex-worker-rights advocates,
contextualized in their liberal theoretical origins. This Part attends to the role of

captures ambiguity and heterogeneity within ostensible groups. Within feminist discourse,
poststructuralists typically adopt a standpoint in which intersecting identities are identified
and often valued. I am grateful to Kathryn Abrams for our lengthy discussions of the
poststructuralist implications of this Article.
31. Aya Gruber, Cyra Choudhury, Leigh Goodmark, and Laura T. Kessler have
identified this rejection of the agent/object dichotomy as one of the three major tenets of an
evolving neofeminism. They identify neofeminism as a new movement in feminist legal
theory that moves beyond the three key feminist orthodoxies of absolutism, the use of police
power to affect change, and the acceptance of the agent/object dichotomy. Aya Gruber,
Leigh Goodmark, Cyra Choudhury & Laura Kessler, University of Baltimore Feminist Legal
Theory Conference: Workshop on Neofeminism (Mar. 4, 2010); see also Aya Gruber, Cyra
Choudury, Leigh Goodmark, Frank Rudy Cooper & Shelley Cavalieri, Fifteenth Annual
LatCrit Conference: NeoFeminism: Exploring New Feminist Analyses and Methodologies
(Oct. 8, 2010).
32. The research and discourse on trafficking overemphasizes trafficking for sexual
purposes to the exclusion of scholarly and public attention to trafficking into different labor
sectors. Although trafficking itself is notoriously difficult to quantify properly, this reporting
bias generates data skewed in the direction of trafficking for sexual purposes. Elzbieta M.
Gozdziak & Elizabeth A. Collett, Research on Human Trafficking in North America: A
Review of Literature, in DATA AND RESEARCH ON HUMAN TRAFFICKING, supra note 15, at 99,
117 (observing that in the North American context, “[a] great deal of research has focused on
trafficking for sexual exploitation, to the detriment of investigating trafficking for bonded
labour and domestic servitude”); see also Liz Kelly, “You Can Find Anything You Want”: A
Critical Reflection on Research on Trafficking in Persons Within and into Europe, in DATA
AND RESEARCH ON HUMAN TRAFFICKING, supra note 15, at 235, 235 (offering “an attempt to
move beyond the focus on trafficking for sexual exploitation to include that for domestic
service and labour exploitation”).
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poststructuralism in shaping a growing movement of theorists and activists who
attend to the particularity of the situations of women of the global South, rejecting a
monolithic understanding of “woman,” even in discussions of trafficking for sexual
purposes. It offers a critical assessment of this theoretical model while identifying
the elements of this approach that are most promising for a new articulation of how
to do feminist law and policy making in a manner that critiques societies but
continues to properly apprehend women as individuals.
Part III articulates a new third-way approach to trafficking by reconciling the
salvageable strands of the above two models and suggesting the basic tenets of a
new public policy approach that grows from third-way feminism. Finally, it
concludes by showing how these tenets can generate specific public policies that
enact this set of feminist principles in interventions in the lives of trafficked
women.
Part IV connects this third-way feminist theory and policy to scholarship on the
capabilities approach to human development, observing that this kind of third-way
feminist policy intervention resonates deeply with the effective and original
approach of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum on how to properly conceptualize
development work. This Part concludes by noting how development and human
rights law that properly apprehends the intended beneficiary can generate
meaningful, lasting change in the lives of women.
I. DOMINANCE FEMINISM AND SEX WORK
A. Sex Work as Oppression: An Overview of Dominance Feminism
By fundamentally questioning the fabric of gender relations in society, the
dominance feminist model has radically shaped contemporary feminist discourse.
Beginning with the primary assertion that men’s sexual coercion of women creates
and sustains the ongoing social inequalities that pervade relationships between the
genders in all aspects of modern society, dominance feminism has broadly
addressed many issues that are pressing to the women’s rights movement.33 A
wide-ranging group of dominance feminist theorists has considered pornography,34

33. For example, Catharine MacKinnon has litigated, drafted amicus briefs, served as an
expert trial witness, and consulted on others’ litigation regarding myriad feminist issues,
including rape, sexual harassment, and pornography. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (MacKinnon as coauthor of brief on hostile environment forms
of sexual harassment); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236–37 (2d Cir. 1995) (MacKinnon
representing a group of women in a mass tort action under the Alien Tort Claims Act against
Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, asserting that they were the victims “of various
atrocities, including brutal acts of rape, forced prostitution, forced impregnation, torture, and
summary execution, carried out by Bosnian-Serb military forces as part of a genocidal
campaign conducted in the course of the Bosnian civil war”).
34. See, e.g., ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1981).
Andrea Dworkin’s work on pornography typifies the way that dominance feminist thinkers
not only generated rich explanatory theories of gender relations, but also engaged in
campaigns for legal change, cognizant of this growing understanding of the nature of sexual
oppression.
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sexual harassment,35 and other forms of sexualized power through this analytical
lens, assessing the prevalence of sexualized domination throughout women’s
lives.36 From its radical roots thirty years ago, this school of thought has generated
a broad-based awareness of the ways in which sexualized coercion is a basic aspect
of society that escapes public awareness because of its hegemonic control over
everyday social encounters.
Sex work and the trafficking of women for sexual purposes have also fallen
under the scrutiny of dominance feminist theorists; Kathleen Barry has perhaps
become the most influential of these writers, not only because of the impact of her
scholarship, but also because she translated her academic interests into activism
through her involvement in founding and directing the Coalition Against
Trafficking in Women.37 Female Sexual Slavery, published in 1979, marked a
fundamental re-visioning of the meaning of women’s sexual labor in maledominated society, consistent with the paradigm-shifting work of the other
dominance feminists.38
Drawing on the scholarship of other dominance feminists including Kate Millet,
Susan Griffin, and Susan Brownmiller, in Female Sexual Slavery, Barry places all
forms of sexual labor in what she called the “rape paradigm,” in which rape is a
political act rather than an individuated experience of individual women.39 By
characterizing all forms of commercial sexual activity as rape, to which no woman
can consent, Barry frames the entire discussion of commercial sex in the terms of
the rape paradigm.40 Advancing from these general principles of dominance
feminism, Barry rapidly jumps from stating that sexual domination defines
women’s lives in society to equating all forms of sexualized domination, including
prostitution and the trafficking of women, due to their shared pervasive context.41

35. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN
(1979).
36. “Pornography and prostitution, including erotic dancing, are blood sports of male
supremacy.” CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Pornography Left and Right, in WOMEN’S LIVES,
MEN’S LAWS 327, 341 (2005).
37. KATHLEEN BARRY, THE PROSTITUTION OF SEXUALITY 5, 17 (1995) [hereinafter
BARRY, THE PROSTITUTION OF SEXUALITY]; see also Jo Doezema, Forced to Choose: Beyond
the Voluntary v. Forced Dichotomy, in GLOBAL SEX WORKERS: RIGHTS, RESISTANCE, AND
REDEFINITION 34, 37 (Kamala Kempadoo & Jo Doezema eds., 1998) (discussing the history
of CATW).
38. KATHLEEN BARRY, FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY (New York Univ. Press 1984) (1979)
[hereinafter BARRY, FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY]. This book laid bare the politicized nature of
relationships between men and women, focusing on how power pervades both public and
private negotiations over sex.
39. Id. at 40–42.
40. See id. at 41. Barry likewise wove other forms of women’s sexual domination into
the fabric of sexually oppressive circumstances in which all women live and discussed the
sexual subjugation of women in all kinds of intimate relationships as part of the problem of
sexualized dominance. Id.
41. Id. at 41–42. Barry here explicitly parallels MacKinnon’s central insight that the
experience of sexualized domination is a defining characteristic of women’s lives in a
gender-subordinating society. While Barry discusses this concept in the context of her work
on trafficking and commercial sexual activity, she is by no means the only scholar to make
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Claiming that “virtually the only distinction that can be made between traffic in
women and street prostitution is that the former involves crossing international
borders,” Barry refuses the traditional distinction between voluntary and
involuntary sexual labor.42 Instead, she creates the category of “sexual slavery,”
and includes within it both international trafficking of women for sexual purposes
and forced street prostitution.43 In short, she shifts the analysis from one of the
means by which women entered sex work to one that focuses on the ultimate end of
sex work, which she considers to be wholly exploitative, in an attempt to moot
counterarguments to her conflation of all prostitution with trafficking for sexual
purposes.44 Because pimps, recruiters, and others who benefit from prostitution use
force or violence in many cases, she suggests that all prostitution is compelled or
violent.45 The net effect is a monolithic account of all kinds of sex work applied to
all women working in sexual labor, no matter how they began the work or what
prompted them to perform it.
However, Barry’s early work was unselfconsciously inconsistent in equating
voluntary and involuntary sex work. Female Sexual Slavery, for example, faulted
legal authorities for their “inability . . . to distinguish between victims and
volunteers”46 and recognized that not all women are forced or defrauded into

these kinds of comprehensive connections between forms of sexualized oppression. For
example, Andrea Dworkin observes how pornography’s major theme is male power,
expressed in myriad forms. DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 34, at 24–25. If anything,
this kind of thinking on sexual violence and gendered subjugation is the shared connection
that allows Barry, MacKinnon, and others to hold in common the name of dominance
feminist. See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE
STATE (1989) [hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY].
42. BARRY, FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY, supra note 38, at 7. This differentiation between
voluntary and involuntary prostitution dates back at least as far as discussions about the
“white slave trade,” the phrase used to describe the traffic in women around the turn of the
twentieth century. Doezema, supra note 37, at 35–36. Morally defensible women, known as
“white slaves,” were the ones tricked into participation in the sexual labor market. Id. Those
who knowingly entered the market were simply common prostitutes. Id. The point of the
distinction was to differentiate the morally pure, who warranted rescue and aid because they
were victims, from the fallen, who had volitionally begun the work and therefore were
culpable for any subsequent harm.
43. BARRY, FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY, supra note 38, at 7. She conflated the two
phenomena by first rejecting the importance of the procurement strategy that pimps or
recruiters use, portraying it as a false dichotomy. Id. In place of this distinction, she
emphasized the material conditions of women who work as sexual laborers. Id. Because both
women who have been coerced, kidnapped, or defrauded and women who have willingly
entered the industry labor under the same conditions of sexualized domination, Barry posited
that these conditions were the true locus of the violence perpetrated against women in
“sexual slavery.” Id.
44. In so doing, Barry replicated the logic of the white slavery debates of the early
twentieth century, which characterized all commercial sex transactions as inherently violent.
For an outstanding historical discussion of consent and women’s sexuality, see PAMELA
HAAG, CONSENT: SEXUAL RIGHTS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM 84
(1999).
45. BARRY, FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY, supra note 38, at 7–8.
46. Id. at 60.
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entering prostitution against their will.47 Yet rather than using these observations to
acknowledge the limitations of her theoretical model, Barry instead suggests that
the examination of an individual woman’s motivation for entering sex work is
merely demonstrative of bias and victim blaming.48 To focus on the means or
motives by which women enter sex work, rather than the harm they suffer therein,
masks the injury and blames the woman for what happened, instead of looking to
the actual social cause, which is the pervasive sexual domination of women.49 In
place of focusing on the complicity of women in their own oppression, Barry
recommends foregrounding the actual working conditions of women in sexual
labor, which escapes an individualist focus and generates a politicized, collective
understanding of the societal source of sexual oppression.50
Indeed, Female Sexual Slavery’s most important contribution is the radical
analytic shift that it proposes for understanding the social meaning of prostitution.
Prior to the advent of dominance feminism, prostitution was traditionally framed as
an economic transaction, building from the trite expression that it is the oldest
profession in the world.51 Critiques of prostitution focused on economic
exploitation as the primary axis of oppression that sex workers experienced. But
Barry shifts this focus, instead enlisting the primary analytical axis of the
dominance feminist school: gender.52 By focusing explicitly on the gendered nature
of sexual slavery, Barry swings from an economic analysis to a solely gender-based
one.53 She rejects the practice of equating male prostitution with female
prostitution, noting that “[t]he victimization and enslavement to which women are
subject in male-dominated society find no equivalent in male experience.”54
Prostitution and trafficking, under Barry’s dominance feminism model, are
exclusively about the sexualized oppression of women by men. This represents a
shift to understanding prostitution and its effect on women as a class, rather than as
isolated, discrete individuals.55

47. Id. at 84.
48. See id.
49. The application of this approach in the arena of trafficking closely mimics its more
common usage in the treatment of rape in general. See, e.g., Amy Grubb & Julie Harrower,
Attribution of Blame in Cases of Rape: An Analysis of Participant Gender, Type of Rape and
Perceived Similarity to the Victim, 13 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 396 (2008)
(documenting how victim blaming functions in rape cases).
50. See BARRY, FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY, supra note 38, at 85.
51. See id. at 9–10. In this conception of prostitution, it is a predictably age-old
economic exchange that women sell sex to men as a mainstay of the economy. Women enter
prostitution much as they would choose any other form of money-making activity, thus
primarily shaping a vision of sex work as about money and labor, not sex, gender, and
power.
52. See id. Again, Barry here theorized in the good company of her dominance feminist
comrades. MacKinnon’s post-Marxist analysis and Barry’s reconceptualization of
prostitution as a secondarily economic transaction are cut from the same cloth. For
MacKinnon on this point, see, for example, MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 41,
at 113.
53. BARRY, FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY, supra note 38, at 9–10.
54. Id. at 11.
55. See BARRY, THE PROSTITUTION OF SEXUALITY, supra note 37, at 9. This gendered,

1422

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 86:1409

In The Prostitution of Sexuality, Barry reconceptualizes Female Sexual Slavery
to make her arguments more pertinent to the substance of the feminist conversation
on trafficking and prostitution in the middle of the 1990s,56 moving from a focus on
“the sexuality of prostitution” and all kinds of sexual exploitation to a new venture
focused on the “prostitution of sexuality” and commodified sexual activity in
particular.57 It reflects the public legal engagement of dominance feminism,
including the passage of the “Dworkin-MacKinnon ordinances”58 and the
international human rights involvement on the issue of trafficking,59 documenting
how these scholars’ theories supported the public feminist actions of the 1980s and
1990s. The rise of legal reform seeking to embody dominance feminist principles
removed the topic from solely theoretical scholarly discourse and placed it squarely
within the public legal arena, thus rendering dominance feminist discussions of
trafficking and sex work especially relevant to ongoing public debates.
The Prostitution of Sexuality makes explicit many of the unstated premises that
Barry had employed in Female Sexual Slavery, a point that Barry acknowledges
early in the second text.60 The Prostitution of Sexuality unambiguously states
Barry’s belief that the consensual engagement in prostitution is both a logical
impossibility and, at its foundation, the wrong analysis of the phenomenon.61
Building from the initial dominance feminist premise that sexual domination
defines the whole of women’s experience, Barry asserts that the reduction of
women from people to the sexualized object of the body is the origin of gendered
oppression.62 Because this reduction is the central element of women’s class-based
experience in the world, Barry fundamentally rejects the liberal notion of consent
as the dispositive factor in the description of domination.63 Instead, she posits that
group-based analysis is reflective of the traditional feminist epistemology that refused to
minimize individual experience, instead proclaiming its class-based analysis under the aegis
of “the personal is political.”
56. Id. at 15–19.
57. Id. at 11. This book exists at the nexus of feminist theory and law, and specifically
attends to the prevalence of legal intervention as the primary way dominance feminists as a
group brought their theoretical positions to practical fruition.
58. Id. at 3. Dworkin and MacKinnon proposed a model anti-pornography civil rights
ordinance. See ANDREA DWORKIN & CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, PORNOGRAPHY AND CIVIL
RIGHTS: A NEW DAY FOR WOMEN’S EQUALITY 138–42 (1988). At least some jurisdictions,
including Indianapolis, passed a variation of this ordinance, though it was ultimately
declared unconstitutional for violation of the First Amendment. See Kelly Ann Cahill, Note,
Hooters: Should There Be an Assumption of the Risk Defense to Some Hostile Work
Environment Sexual Harassment Claims?, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1107, 1146 n.204 (1995) (citing
American Booksellers Assoc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 332 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d mem., 475
U.S. 1001 (1986)).
59. By shifting the discourse away from the issue of consent, dominance feminists
accomplished the insertion of their philosophy directly into the legal regime that now
controls the issue of trafficking internationally. BARRY, THE PROSTITUTION OF SEXUALITY,
supra note 37, at 4–6.
60. Id. at 9.
61. See id. at 17. In contrast, Female Sexual Slavery had merely danced around the topic
of consent.
62. Id. at 23.
63. Id.
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the key failing of liberal theory in understanding the sexual domination of women
is its inability to properly frame oppression due to its excessive reliance on the role
of consent.64 In place of a liberal conception of the individual as the actor in
question, Barry advances a sweeping critique of the sexualized and gendered
domination of women that pervades social life, stating, “In this work I am shifting
from the nearly singular standard of consent or force in the determination of
violation to its full human, interactive bodied experience, to span the range of
oppression from individualized coercion to class domination.”65 By rejecting the
importance of the liberal ideas of consent or individuated volition in assessing
whether domination has occurred, Barry thus prepares the way for a sweeping
reconceptualization of both the class-based nature of oppression and the experience
of sexualized domination.66
The centerpiece of Barry’s critique is her four-pronged description of the ways
in which prostitution “socially constructs the sexual exploitation of women.”67
Prostitution sex distances women’s very selves from the act of prostitution, or
causes a kind of internal fragmentation for women who do sex work.68 It causes
women to disengage themselves from the work they do and the ways they spend
their time.69 Prostitution demands that women dissociate themselves from the work
or segment themselves into parts for purchase by men.70 Finally, women who
perform sex work experience disembodiment and remove themselves from the
work they do in order to survive it with their identities intact.71 Barry uses this
analysis to bolster the claim made in Female Sexual Slavery: that no woman can
choose to do the work of prostitution for two reasons. First, it involves a level of
self-harm to which no woman could consent; second, no other meaningful labor
option exists, which renders choice impossible.72 The sum of this four-part
proposition thus supports her universalized approach to prostitution and trafficking:
as all women are exploited, no matter how they entered the sex trade, the same
theoretical explanation of their condition is appropriate in all cases. One theory of
sex work accounts for the experiences of literally every woman engaged in it.
At its essence, then, Barry offers a framework for the consideration of
prostitution and trafficking for sexual purposes that views both phenomena

64. Id.
65. Id. at 23–24. In so doing, she also stakes out clearly her break from liberal feminist
thought, which typified the earliest years of feminist theory and activism. See, e.g., JOHN
STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN (1869), reprinted in MILL 133, 133 (Alan Ryan
ed., 1997) (“That the principle which regulates the existing social relations between the two
sexes—the legal subordination of one sex to the other—is wrong in itself, and now one of
the chief hindrances to human improvement; and that it ought to be replaced by a principle
of perfect equality, admitting no power or privilege on the one side, nor disability on the
other.”).
66. BARRY, THE PROSTITUTION OF SEXUALITY, supra note 37, at 24.
67. Id. at 29.
68. Id. at 30.
69. Id. at 31.
70. Id. at 34–35.
71. Id. at 35.
72. Id. at 29–33.
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singularly through the lens of the subjugation of women as a monolithic class on
the basis of sexualized domination. A number of other scholars have adopted,
refined, and expanded on Barry’s groundbreaking work on female sexual labor
since the publication of Female Sexual Slavery, and especially since the more
recent publication of The Prostitution of Sexuality.73 The model of feminism that
Barry and others who share her philosophy espouse presents a radical
reconceptualization of the meaning of sexual labor in contemporary society.74
Other scholar-activists have heavily engaged in the continued discourse that
Barry’s earliest writings prompted, persistently and publicly advocating the
abolition of all forms of commercial sexual activity.75 Their organizations sponsor
activist groups of former sex workers, domestic and international lobbying efforts,
and active engagement in the public and scholarly discourse, and have brought
Barry’s theories to practical fruition. While these newer scholars have contributed
original voices to the conversation and have brought public attention to the general
theoretical orientation of dominance feminists, their foci differ in meaningful ways
from the theory that Barry forwarded initially.
More recently, dominance feminists have increased their focus on the role of
intersecting axes of oppression in prostitution and trafficking for sexual purposes,
particularly when considering international trafficking situations.76 While Barry

73. Indeed, Barry’s terminology of “sexual slavery” has been adopted even by many
who write in a more journalistic manner on human trafficking. See, e.g., ANDREA PARROT &
NINA CUMMINGS, SEXUAL ENSLAVEMENT OF GIRLS AND WOMEN WORLDWIDE (2008); TO
PLEAD OUR OWN CAUSE: PERSONAL STORIES BY TODAY’S SLAVES 1 (Kevin Bales & Zoe Trod
eds., 2008). However, the use of the terminology of slavery, particularly in the United States,
with its history of legally entrenched chattel slavery of imported African people and their
descendants, to describe indentured sexual labor raises real questions in the legal context of
whether this terminology is legally accurate or a form of politicizing the phenomenon to
raise public attention.
74. See BARRY, FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY, supra note 38; BARRY, THE PROSTITUTION OF
SEXUALITY, supra note 37.
75. These most notably include Evelina Giobbe, who created the organization known as
WHISPER (Women Hurt in Systems of Prostitution Engaged in Revolt) in 1986, and Janice
Raymond, one of the co-executive directors of CATW (Coalition Against Trafficking of
Women). BARRY, THE PROSTITUTION OF SEXUALITY, supra note 37, at 5–6. Giobbe and
Raymond have been involved in anti-trafficking and anti-prostitution efforts for decades,
largely as activists and organizational leaders. While Raymond does write, her books do not
focus on the issue of sex work. See, e.g., JANICE G. RAYMOND, A PASSION FOR FRIENDS:
TOWARD A PHILOSOPHY OF FEMALE AFFECTION (1986); JANICE G. RAYMOND, TRANSSEXUAL
EMPIRE: THE MAKING OF THE SHE-MALE (1979); JANICE G. RAYMOND, WOMEN AS WOMBS:
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE BATTLE OVER WOMEN’S FREEDOM (1993).
76. Catharine MacKinnon has acknowledged the essentialist critique of dominance
feminism, but dismisses it as “a sneer, a tool of woman-bashing, with consequences that far
outrun its merits,” asserting instead that she does not “relegate women of color to footnotes
and brackets, . . . assume that all women are white, . . . [or] require women to choose
between their ethnic identification and their gender.” CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Keeping It
Real: On Anti-“Essentialism,” in WOMEN’S LIVES, MEN’S LAWS, supra note 36, at 84, 88.
MacKinnon argues that the charge of essentialism has “undermined the contributions that
dominance theory, as developed in feminism, could make to antiracist work. Feminist
dominance theory is a theory of social and political inequality as such. It builds on
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dealt with this issue as one entwined with, but secondary to, the sexualized
domination of women in prostitution,77 other dominance theorists have considered
multiple forms of oppression as ways that dominance actually functions in the lives
of real women.78 Racism, classism, and colonialist privilege function in
combination to “exacerbate oppressive social and economic conditions that make
poor women and women of color particularly vulnerable to prostitution.”79 In the
trafficking and prostitution context, the dominance feminist analysis of sexualized
antiracism and builds it in.” Id. at 89–90. MacKinnon raises the specter that anti-essentialism
“corrodes group identification and solidarity and leaves us with one-at-a-time personhood:
liberal individualism.” Id. at 90. Thus, she maintains that dominance feminism offers “a
reality of group oppression that exists whether we identify with our group or not.” Id.
77. Barry attempts to inform her analysis with an acknowledgment of intersecting axes
of oppression, including race and colonialism, but this effort is somewhat incomplete. See
BARRY, THE PROSTITUTION OF SEXUALITY, supra note 37, at 24. She suggests that racial
difference, like sexual difference, is used to justify the oppression specifically of women of
color in the commodification of sexuality. See id. She notes that men who are johns often
enlist racialized stereotypes as an element of the sexual performance they compel from
women, see id. at 34, a phenomenon that I have noted firsthand; the experiences of Nigerian
women trafficked into Southern Italy are rife with racialized violence perpetrated against
them by white men.
Yet Barry fails to appreciate the compounding effect of racial stereotypes in creating
the demand for sex workers from particular geographic locales and specific ethnic identities,
which I have observed in many parts of the world. In Italy, Nigerian participants in the
commercial sex sector are streetwalkers. Women from former Soviet republics usually work
in brothels. Italian women and other western Europeans are most commonly call girls. In
Southeast Asia, the shade of an indigenous sex worker’s skin can dictate the level of the
commercial sex industry in which she may work. Streetwalkers are uncommon in Thailand,
but the darkest-skinned indigenous women work in the most ramshackle of the brothels,
which manual laborers frequent, while fairer indigenous and Thai women can work in the
karaoke bars that are the hub of student life. The fairest-skinned women with the best
command of the spoken Thai language work in high-priced clubs where Thai, Japanese, and
Korean corporate employees transact business.
Likewise, Barry recognizes that conditions of economic disparity, feudal marriage,
and rural poverty render particular, racially oppressed groups of women susceptible to the
market for sex work. Id. at 175, 178. Yet, she maintains the gendered axis of oppression and
the sweeping critique of sexualized dominance as her primary explanation for the incidence
of trafficking and other forms of prostitution, even where other circumstances are more
central to the compulsion of women into sexual labor. See id. at 196–97. Barry
acknowledges that these women are not “trafficked” in the traditional sense of the term when
they choose to engage in sexual labor; she speaks of the choice as a coercive one, not one
representative of a freely made decision. See id. But she fails to fully comprehend how
additional axes of oppression in a particular woman’s life might make a choice that appears
to be constructed by gendered oppression one that actually releases a woman from the most
pernicious effects of other kinds of oppression present in her life.
78. In this regard, Barry’s dominance feminist successors’ writings reflect the important
work of poststructuralist feminists, who reject singular discourses in favor of ones that have
been described as “poly-vocal” by poststructuralists such as Marie Ashe. See Marie Ashe,
Mind’s Opportunity: Birthing a Poststructuralist Feminist Jurisprudence, 38 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 1129, 1169 (1988).
79. Vednita Carter & Evelina Giobbe, Duet: Prostitution, Racism and Feminist
Discourse, 10 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 37, 44–45 (1999).
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privilege has also been expanded to include an explicitly racial element that
recognizes the role of white male supremacy as the primary oppressive force in
sexualized labor.80 Where Barry comfortably posited a single vision of the
oppression of sex workers, her successors in the dominance school grasp the ways
that poststructuralism has shown how intersecting axes of oppression complicate
this vision and make the achievement of a cogent unitary model of oppression
impossible.81 Poststructuralist scholars thus succeed in rendering the analytic frame
cognizant of the myriad forms of oppression that jointly create the system of
sexualized, racialized, and colonialized domination in which victims of human
trafficking function and survive. This stands in contrast to Barry’s model, which
considers gender in isolation as the primary way in which all women, including
women of color, indigenous women, women of the global South, and poor women,
experience oppression as sex workers.82 Barry’s successors have thus informed
dominance feminism with the insights that poststructuralism has contributed to
feminist thought in general.
B. Weaknesses of Dominance Feminism in the Trafficking Realm
Yet three primary conceptual problems pervade the work of Kathleen Barry and
her dominance feminist peers. First, they exploit the lack of definitional clarity
between voluntary sex work and involuntary trafficked sex work in order to further
their theoretical position about the exploitative nature of all sexual labor. Second,
the universalized categorization of all forms of sexual labor as inherently
exploitative means that the theory refuses to engage with any counterexamples to
its presumptions and, in effect, fails to account for the lives and experiences of
myriad women. Third, the pervasive and singular definition of women who are sex
workers as universally oppressed rejects any liberatory possibility for the role of
sex work in the lives of the women who perform it.
As described above in Barry’s work, dominance feminist theory as applied to
the realm of prostitution and trafficking takes full form in the conflation of
voluntary and involuntary sex work.83 This technique serves two central purposes.
First, it shifts the focus away from the liberal approach that centers on autonomy
and consent. In so doing, dominance feminist theorists on trafficking create the
oppositional nature of their fundamentally radical approach as set against the
traditionally liberal conception of the individual. Second, and more importantly for
the purposes of this analysis, it allows for the broad imposition of the theory on
ever larger groups of women. Such a propensity for universalizing tends to mask
the differences between sex workers, the conditions that predicate their entry into
the sexual labor market, and the situations in which they perform the work of
commodified sex. Rather than offering a description adequately nuanced to reflect
the particularity of individual narratives, these universalizing tendencies lose the
individual in a theory painted in broad strokes.

80.
81.
82.
83.

See id. at 38, 44–45.
See id.
See BARRY, THE PROSTITUTION OF SEXUALITY, supra note 37, at 196–97.
See supra notes 60–72 and accompanying text.
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The assertion of such a broadly applied theory that hinges on a monolithic
account of sexual labor as inherently exploitative overtly disregards all experiences
of individual sex workers that undermine this theoretical perspective.84 In short, it
means that the theory accounts for sex workers engaged in pro-sex-work efforts as
experiencing false consciousness, or as existing in abnormal circumstances that
thus do not merit analysis, and, therefore, disregards their experiences without
actually addressing them individually.85 At times, dominance feminists brandish
outlandishly unqualified, universalized opinions on sex work that dehumanize the
individual women who engage in it:
A good prostitute is devoid of a unique and personal identity. She is
empty space surrounded by flesh into which men deposit evidence of
their masculinity. She does not exist so that he can. Prostitution done
correctly begins with theft and ends with the subsequent abandonment
of self. What remains is essential to the job: the mouth, the genitals,
anus, breasts . . . and the label.86
Rather than allowing for a contextualized particularity in approaching the lives
of women engaged in sex work, such descriptions are intended to obviate relevant
differences between individuals so that the theory can account for all women. Yet,
to return to the introductory narrative of this Article, the Shan women of that story
cannot be described in this way. They claim their own identity, not generated
within their work but in fact as the predicating element of their work. In the face of
socially generated oppression on axes of ethnicity and indigeneity, the Shan women
working in Thai brothels claimed sex work as a means of escape from the
repression of the Burmese junta. Other commentators on migrant sex work have
similarly noted that many women leave their country cognizant of the kind of work
that awaits them, but still migrate for employment purposes to do sex work.87 The

84. Angela Harris has persuasively discussed how Catharine MacKinnon’s “work,
though powerful and brilliant in many ways, relies on what [Harris] call[s] gender
essentialism—the notion that a unitary ‘essential’ women’s experience can be isolated and
described independently of race, class, sexual orientation, and other realities of experience.”
Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581,
585 (1990); see also id. at 590–601 (offering a critique of MacKinnon specifically and
dominance feminism generally). The critique that I offer here of Barry’s treatment of sex
work resonates with Harris’s insight that a feminist theory that purports to describe women’s
lives without regard for “realities of experience” is insufficient.
85. In her effort to undermine the application of false consciousness theory, Mari J.
Matsuda defines false consciousness as the idea that members of subordinated classes are
incapable of offering any valuable insight on their own subordination or that their
subordination taints their own analysis. Mari J. Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified and the
False Consciousness Problem, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1763, 1777–78 (1990). However, Matsuda
suggests that academics have a strong incentive to believe that poor and working people
have little of value to say about law, social life, or politics. Id. at 1778.
86. Carter & Giobbe, supra note 79, at 46 (emphasis omitted).
87. See Kinsey Alden Dinan, Migrant Thai Women Subjected to Slavery-Like Abuses in
Japan, 8 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1113, 1117–20 (2002) (describing the situation of Thai
women whose migration to Japan to engage in prostitution was facilitated by a trafficker).
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crude narrative of the dominance feminist approach loses the particularized
elements of the lives of trafficked women. In the place of individualized nuance,
broad-based assumptions appear as the central descriptors of the lives of individual
trafficked women.
This loss of particularity comes at a cost to the women whom dominance
feminists claim to describe. Because the theory offers a singular description of the
meaning of trafficking in the lives of women and leaves no room for ambivalent
experiences of the phenomenon, it cannot account for the potentially conflicting
experiences of different women or the complexity of the responses of individual
women. From a purely theoretical perspective, dominance feminism offers a
singular perspective on trafficking and no opportunity for dialogue with alternative
viewpoints. On one hand, this approach encapsulates the potent awareness of the
harms that accompany sex work and the impact of such injuries on real women. Yet
dominance feminism also displays a calculated neglect of the freedom or autonomy
that the work of sexual labor offers in the lives of women who find themselves
oppressed along the lines of ethnicity and indigeneity. By overlooking the
potentially liberatory qualities of sex work for women from marginalized groups,
dominance feminism fails to account for the personal narratives of women whose
experiences contradict the thrust of the theory. This shortcoming generates societal
costs as well in preventing the creation of a broader public understanding of the
possibility of an ambivalent meaning of trafficking and transnational sex work.
Dominance feminist theory of trafficking renders simple an outrageously complex
issue and does so by relegating dissenting voices to the margins.
Beyond these individualized costs to specific sex workers, the unitary
perspective of dominance feminism also comes at a social price. It denies the
broader public an accurate understanding of the complexities of trafficking and
reduces it to a singular phenomenon that a single intervention can solve. This is the
real expense of dominance feminism to the world: it presents only a limited vision
of trafficking and then enlists this incomplete model to sell the sole public policy
intervention of abolition, which alone is insufficient to cause broad-based change in
the lives of sex workers. Dominance feminists see incisively into the social nature
of sexual domination, but their generalized theory of dominance fails to account for
the reality of trafficking, and thus generates legal and public policy interventions
that offer, at best, partial solutions.
II. CONSENT, COERCION, AND TRAFFICKING FROM THE LIBERAL FEMINIST
TRADITION
A. Liberal Feminist Theory, Poststructuralism, and Sex Work Advocacy
A liberal conception of the individual as the agent of her own life lies at the
foundation of the liberal feminist position on the trafficking of women for sexual
purposes. Whereas the dominance feminist position initially asserts a broad
characterization of the society into which individuals are thereafter inserted, liberal
feminists start with the first principle of the equality of all human beings by virtue
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of their capacity for reason and choice.88 Liberal feminism builds on classical
liberalism by clarifying that the same notion of equality of men that animates
traditional liberalism also defines women.89 According to Martha Nussbaum, the
goal of liberal political theorizing is “to put people into a position of agency and
choice, not to push them into functioning in ways deemed desirable.”90 At its core,
liberal political philosophy regards the individual as the primary actor of concern
and centers its analysis of society on the treatment of and respect for the individual
and his or her choices.91
These fundamental tenets of the liberal feminist political model form the
foundation of the sex-worker-rights position that stands in opposition to the
dominance feminist model articulated in Part I. Beginning from a rich, liberal
concept of the individual woman as agent of her own life and choices, proponents
of a sex-worker-rights model forward a vision of women autonomously choosing to
engage in sexual labor as they would choose any other form of employment.92
Exploitation and coercion are duly considered as incompatible with this model of
sexual labor, but only insofar as they override the choices of an individual.93
Consistent with the fundamental tenets of classical liberalism, liberal feminist
advocates of an autonomy-based approach to sexual labor consider the consent of
an individual woman to be the touchstone for assessing the presence of
domination.94 The liberal feminist analysis of abuse in the realm of prostitution
turns on whether engagement in sexual labor is consensual or by force, fraud, or
coercion.95
Poststructuralist feminism also informs the perspective of sex-worker-rights
advocates on trafficking for sexual purposes. Poststructuralism rejects liberal
feminism’s singular definition of what women are, embracing a more complex
description that comprehends difference among women and allows for dissent.96
Poststructuralism is a response to what Angela Harris calls “[t]he need for multiple

88. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, Introduction: Feminism, Internationalism, Liberalism to
SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 1, 10 (1999).
89. See id.
90. Id. at 11.
91. This liberal understanding of the choice of the individual as relevant to the law’s
treatment of sexuality is a relatively new contribution to American jurisprudence. See
Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL.
L. REV. 777, 794–95 (1988).
92. For example, Nussbaum’s treatment of sex work and trafficking begins with a
consideration of the ways in which sexual labor is similar to and different from other ways in
which individuals take money for the use of their bodies in such work as factory work in a
chicken processing plant, domestic service, nightclub singing, teaching philosophy,
providing massages, and what she terms “colonoscopy art.” See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM,
Whether from Reason or Prejudice: Taking Money for Bodily Services, in SEX AND SOCIAL
JUSTICE, supra note 88, at 276, 276, 280–85.
93. See Priscilla Alexander, Feminism, Sex Workers, and Human Rights, in WHORES
AND OTHER FEMINISTS 83, 91, 93 (Jill Nagle ed., 1997).
94. Cf. id. at 93.
95. See id.
96. See Ashe, supra note 78, at 1169 (discussing the relationship between absolute
liberalism and “poly-vocal . . . radical feminist insight”).
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consciousness in the feminist movement” because it has moved feminist thought
“away from univocal toward multivocal theories of women’s experience.”97
Although poststructuralist feminist theorists have not expressly focused on
trafficking and sex work, unlike their liberal and dominance sisters, their authority
shapes the way some sex-worker-rights advocates theorize trafficking for sexual
purposes. When scholars of trafficking discuss differences among women,
accounting for the roles of race, indigeneity, and country of origin in the
experiences of trafficked women or questioning any singular articulation of what it
means to be trafficked, they pay tribute to the valuable contributions of
poststructuralist feminists.98 Although not all sex-worker-rights advocates, who
typically leverage liberal thought,99 invoke poststructuralist insights, this strain of
theory is sufficiently prominent in this genre of writing to merit closer examination
throughout this discussion of sex-worker-rights advocacy.
International human rights law most clearly evidences the intersection of
classical liberal feminism with the issue of trafficking. The primary legal
instruments of international human rights entrench a fundamentally liberal notion
of rights as rooted in the individual person and abused at the individual level as
well.100 In part, this focus is an outgrowth of the human rights perspective on the
liberal conception of the right of the individual to make self-determining choices in
pursuit of the good and to define those choices independently.101 Because of the
primacy of the liberal view of human rights in international law, it is predictable
that the primary international instrument controlling trafficking, the Protocol to
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and

97. Harris, supra note 84, at 586–87.
98. See, e.g., Acknowledgments to GLOBAL SEX WORKERS: RIGHTS, RESISTANCE, AND
REDEFINITION, supra note 37.
99. Jody Freeman likewise “treat[s] prostitutes’ rights groups as having the same
ideological base as those we might call liberal feminists.” Jody Freeman, The Feminist
Debate over Prostitution Reform: Prostitutes’ Rights Groups, Radical Feminists, and the
(Im)possibility of Consent, 5 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 75, 75 (1989). However, it warrants
mention that most sex-worker-rights advocates would probably eschew being defined as
liberal, for reasons of the critique offered below.
100. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc.
A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) (providing human rights to persons on an individual, rather than
collective, basis).
101. The codification of the Western liberal understanding of the individual and the state
is more a demonstration of the victory of the West during the initial discussions of human
rights than any kind of confirmation of the superiority of this position. The ramifications of
the entrenchment of this version of human rights continue to be experienced in the
difficulties that the human rights community faces in seeking recognition of economic,
social, and cultural rights as the equals to the civil and political rights that the global West
successfully entrenched in the post–World War II period of international law making, just as
the Cold War began. See Lesley Wexler, The Promise and Limits of Local Human Rights
Internationalism, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 599, 611 (2010) (“The emphasis on political and
civil rights, as opposed to economic rights, both kept with domestic commitments and
allowed criticism of cold war adversaries.”).
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Children (“Trafficking Protocol”), would continue to enlist a similar vision of the
individual as the subject of international law on trafficking.102
During the debates surrounding the passage of the Trafficking Protocol,
liberalism as captured by international human rights instruments came under attack
by dominance feminist arguments consistent with the historical abolitionist
perspective on sex work.103 Sex-worker advocates continued to promote the idea
that trafficked persons could consent to illicit activity, including prostitution,
despite the dominance feminist insistence that all sexual labor was trafficking and
violated women’s human rights, regardless of whether coercion occurred.104
Feminists favoring sex-worker rights asserted that in the context of codifying legal
definitions of trafficking, sexual labor was equivalent to any other form of labor
into which persons could be trafficked.105 As a result, the issue was not the sexual
nature of the labor, but the way in which the laborer was recruited or transported
into the work. To prevent the codification of an abolitionist understanding of
trafficking for sexual purposes, this group sought to define trafficking according to
the use of coercion in bringing a woman into a situation of trafficking, such that all
women working as sex workers would not be considered victims of trafficking.106
While dominance feminists sought to negate the importance of consent in
trafficking, sex-worker-rights advocates consistently advanced the concept that
coercion, or the denial of the opportunity for meaningful consent, is the touchstone
of the definition of trafficking under international human rights law.107 The
Trafficking Protocol ultimately codified this position by specifying that the consent
of the individual woman is not enough to overcome the use of coercion so as to
negate the trafficking.108

102. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 6. However, it is important to note that the
Trafficking Protocol itself does not offer a human-rights-centric approach to trafficking.
Rather, as a protocol supplementing the Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime,
it takes an expressly law-and-order position, addressing trafficking largely as a criminal
matter. See id.
103. See Jo Doezema, Who Gets to Choose? Coercion, Consent, and the UN Trafficking
Protocol, in GENDER, TRAFFICKING, AND SLAVERY 20, 21–23 (Rachel Masika ed., 2002).
104. Id. At the same time, dominance feminists did not insist on the extension of their
definition of trafficking to other labor sectors. The goal was to achieve an international
definition that included all forms of sexual labor as trafficking, so that when any woman was
transported for the purposes of prostitution, it would qualify as trafficking even where she
may have consented to the movement and subsequent labor. In contrast, migrant
farmworkers or domestic workers, for example, could still render meaningful consent to be
voluntarily transported to engage in their labor sector in another state. See id.
105. Id. This perspective is consistent with the reality that both men and women are
trafficked into agriculture, sweatshop, domestic, restaurant, and other kinds of labor as well
as into the sexual labor that was the basis of the dominance feminist lobbying efforts in the
negotiations leading up to the passage of the Trafficking Protocol in 2000. However, human
rights advocates have noted that all of these labor sectors share the “3D” characteristics:
difficult, dirty, and dangerous. See Dinan, supra note 87, at 1114.
106. See Doezema, supra note 37, at 34.
107. See, e.g., NUSSBAUM, supra note 92, at 288.
108. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 6, at art. 3(b). However, dominance feminists offer
an interpretation of the international instrument consistent with their definition of all
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Indeed, it was in the context of these public policy conflicts that feminist
activist-scholars developed a rich theory of consent in relation to the meaning of
coercion in the context of trafficking. At the most basic level, this crucial stage in
the international dialogue on prostitution and trafficking acknowledged the agency
of sex workers.109 Some theorists are careful to note the distinction between women
who are lured or compelled into performing sexual labor and women who choose to
engage in the work;110 this analysis applies in a similar way to distinguishing
between voluntary migration for purposes of prostitution and involuntary
trafficking.111 Drawing on poststructuralism’s understanding of the multivocal
experience of women as a class, these theorists focus particular attention on the fact
that third-world women who may encounter oppressions based in colonialism,
racism, and indigeneity can still decide to migrate for the purposes of sexual
labor.112 Or, in the alternative, they may choose to migrate and discover that the

prostitution as trafficking. The interpretive notes to the Trafficking Protocol contain the
following statement:
The travaux préparatoires should indicate that the Protocol addresses the
exploitation of the prostitution of others and other forms of sexual exploitation
only in the context of trafficking in persons. The terms “exploitation of the
prostitution of others” or “other forms of sexual exploitation” are not defined in
the Protocol, which is therefore without prejudice to how States Parties address
prostitution in their respective domestic laws.
Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime, Interpretative Notes for the Official Records (travaux préparatoires) of the
Negotiation of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and
the Protocols Thereto, ¶ 64, U.N. Doc. A/55/383/Add. 1 (Nov. 3 2000). Dominance
feminists interpret this to mean that their definition of all sex work as trafficking and thus
sexual exploitation could be included within “other forms of sexual exploitation.” See Janice
G. Raymond, The New UN Trafficking Protocol, 25 WOMEN’S STUD. INT’L F. 491, 495
(2002). Thus, while the international law instrument forwards a coercion-based trafficking
definition, the abolitionists still claim victory in this model due to the explanatory notes. Id.
Anne Gallagher has suggested that this ambiguity in interpretation will become problematic
as the Protocol is implemented and international relations are shaped accordingly. Anne
Gallagher, Human Rights and the New UN Protocols on Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling:
A Preliminary Analysis, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 975, 984–88 (2001).
109. Doezema, supra note 37, at 40 (noting that United Nations recommendations on
violence against women of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) began, in the 1990s, to identify the prostitute as a
subject with rights to be protected, not merely a player complicit in the crime of
prostitution).
110. Cf. Erick Gjerdingen, Note, Suffocation Inside a Cold Storage Truck and Other
Problems with Trafficking as “Exploitation” and Smuggling as Choice Along the ThaiBurmese Border, ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 699, 699 (2009) (identifying how the
exploitation of smuggled migrants who voluntarily sought to cross the Thai-Burmese border
for work was not recognized by law enforcement because of their volition in leaving
Burma).
111. See Kamala Kempadoo, The Migrant Tightrope: Experiences from the Caribbean,
in GLOBAL SEX WORKERS: RIGHTS, RESISTANCE, AND REDEFINITION, supra note 37, at 124,
125–27.
112. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 92, at 296.
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only work available to them in their destination country is sexual labor.113 In either
case, the choice to migrate remains a volitional one consistent with a liberal vision
of the individual capable of making decisions for his or her own life, informed by
the poststructuralist awareness of difference among women.
Reconciling this theory of volitional sex work with the reality that women
ultimately take different paths to migrate for work in the sex sector can be
challenging. Theorists problematize these myriad paths in dramatically different
ways relating to the woman’s ability to maintain her autonomy.114 In the most basic
sense, some claim that a woman’s decision to work in sexual labor can be a freely
made, autonomous choice;115 it thus follows that voluntary migration for the same
labor end could also be envisioned. At the other extreme, there are women who
encounter coercion consistent with that codified in the Trafficking Protocol
definition when entering migratory sex work and experience threats, fraud,
deception, or bribery as the trafficker attempts to assert control.116 The crucial
difference between these two concepts of autonomy and coercion is the level of
interference that is permitted before a choice becomes coerced. The Doezema
definition of choice seems to suggest that simply by merit of having been chosen
by a woman, the decision becomes volitional or autonomous. In contrast, the
Trafficking Protocol definition envisions a form of autonomy that can be threatened
more easily, by the many forms of interference it suggests qualify as coercion. Yet
the Trafficking Protocol offers what I characterize as a generally liberal vision of
trafficking for sexual purposes because it theorizes autonomy as an individual
attribute, which is shaped by poststructuralism insofar as it allows for plural
definitions or experiences of coercion. Under the Trafficking Protocol, coercive
social factors infringe on the autonomy of an individual; they do not render groups
incapable of making autonomous decisions.
Further obscuring the question of the meaning of coercion is the reality that a
woman’s understanding of her position in relation to her trafficker changes over
time.117 A woman may migrate independently, but then be coerced into a position
of sexual labor while looking for employment abroad. Or, a woman may
voluntarily place herself in a brothel, having been explicitly deceived about the

113. See, e.g., GAIL PHETERSON, Right to Asylum, Migration, and Prostitution, in THE
PROSTITUTION PRISM 100, 104 (1996).
114. Dina Francesca Haynes has identified the fuzzy boundary between trafficking and
the abuse of migrant laborers, an observation that is accurate in all labor sectors, not only sex
work. See generally Dina Francesca Haynes, Exploitation Nation: The Thin and Grey Legal
Lines Between Trafficked Persons and Abused Migrant Laborers, 23 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2009).
115. See Doezema, supra note 37, at 37 (discussing the Global Alliance Against
Trafficking in Women’s stand on the possibility of voluntary prostitution).
116. See Trafficking Protocol, supra note 6, at art. 3(a) (defining trafficking based
primarily on “the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of
deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving
of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another
person, for the purpose of exploitation”).
117. See Susanne Thorbek, Prostitution in a Global Context: Changing Patterns, in
TRANSNATIONAL PROSTITUTION: CHANGING PATTERNS IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 1, 5 (Susanne
Thorbek & Bandana Pattanaik eds., 2002).
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intolerable conditions of work there. Questions abound about the definition of
consent and the extent of coercion in situations that are not clear-cut; simply
identifying a victim of trafficking based on a framework of consent and coercion
can be a challenge.118 Even more complex is the identification of a trafficker—one
commentator has described traffickers, only half in jest, as “like travel agents, only
rather more expensive.”119 The ambivalence with which many trafficked women
regard their traffickers further complicates the goal of respecting women’s
autonomy, when these relationships can be fraught with multiple meanings.120
Additional complexity arises in the reality that women make choices to migrate
for sex work in the context of other influences on their lives, a fact which sexworker-rights theorists address in different ways.121 Nussbaum suggests that the
case of a woman who enters prostitution because of a lack of better economic
alternatives creates a situation where the woman’s “autonomy has been infringed
but in a different way” than the woman who has been coerced.122 The individual

118. See id. at 4–6.
119. Id. at 5.
120. In my own work with trafficked women, I have encountered this problem of
trafficked women’s ambivalence toward their traffickers. A Nigerian woman with whom I
worked in Italy had a serious heart condition that had been exacerbated by irregular sleeping
habits compelled by her trafficker’s insistence that she work the streets each night until
sunrise. The condition required hospitalization, which I hoped would give her the chance to
get away from her trafficker and establish independence in Italy. I thus did not inform the
trafficker of the woman’s hospitalization. However, my client desperately wanted to talk to
the trafficker because this was her primary source of social support outside the social service
community. So she asked an Italian doctor with a limited knowledge of English if she could
use his phone to call “her sister.” His rudimentary English and lack of culturally competent
knowledge that Nigerian women often refer to acquaintances from the same cultural group
as sisters led him to oblige her request. I was shocked to arrive at the hospital the next day
and encounter the trafficker lambasting the doctor for his refusal to release the patient, her
sex worker. My client rapidly recognized that she was only a business interest to the
trafficker, who showed no concern with her medical condition, and became enormously
frustrated at the situation because of the complicated nature of the relationship she had with
this woman who was simultaneously her pimp, trafficker, countrywoman, and friend. Such
complications are common in work with trafficked women and mean that concepts of
autonomy and coercion vacillate. This client perceived herself to be autonomously working
for this madam, until the moment when the madam revealed herself to be a business manager
and not a friend. My client, who had entered the hospital feeling a sense of autonomy, left
cognizant of the coercion under which she truly lived.
121. For example, Pheterson discusses the role of political oppression in women’s
choices to pursue sex work, PHETERSON, supra note 113, at 102, while Kamala Kempadoo
emphasizes the role of trafficking as a way for women to avoid the negative repercussions of
globalization on local economies, Kamala Kempadoo, Introduction: Globalizing Sex
Workers’ Rights to GLOBAL SEX WORKERS: RIGHTS, RESISTANCE, AND REDEFINITION, supra
note 37, at 1, 17. Kempadoo further observes that sex work is usually just one of many
activities a woman uses to earn money, and that most of the time it is done “for family wellbeing or survival; for working class women to clothe, feed and educate their children; and
for young women and men to sustain themselves when the family income is inadequate.” Id.
at 4.
122. NUSSBAUM, supra note 92, at 296.
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may have the complete personal ability for autonomous decision making including
the capacity for self-reflection and bargaining, which are pivotal elements of the
liberal definition of autonomy.123 Yet in the face of only unappealing options, a
woman’s choice to engage in sex work cannot be termed a truly autonomous one,
according to Nussbaum’s argument, although it may be the best option from the
available array of life choices.124 A strict definition of coercion cannot always
capture the nuances of the softly coercive elements within the lives of women who
seemingly autonomously choose to migrate for sex work.
Other theorists draw heavily on poststructuralist and antiessentialist feminism’s
valuation of actual individual experience to assert the inadequacy of liberal
autonomy in the face of limited life choices.125 Consistent with the shift in focus
that the international dialogue on the Trafficking Protocol precipitated, some
proponents of a sex-worker-rights theory of trafficking suggest that the liberal
preoccupation with consent as the linchpin for the determination of oppression is an
illegitimate one because it distracts from what should be more central concerns to
sex-worker-rights advocates.126 For example, Jo Doezema claims that the
perpetuation of the voluntary/forced dichotomy imposes “the wrong theoretical
framework” for the analysis of the experiences of sex workers.127 When consent is
centered in the conversation about human rights and sex work, abuses perpetrated
against women who consented to perform the work are too easily ignored.128
Focusing on whether a woman has agreed to labor masks whether her labor
conditions are incompatible with her basic human rights.
Perhaps even more problematically from the perspective of sex-worker-rights
advocates, the distinction between voluntary and involuntary sex workers becomes
the contemporary permutation of the innocent/complicit dichotomy129 that has
plagued legal and public policy debate about women’s sexuality for decades.130

123. See id.
124. See id.
125. I consider these theorists in my general discussion of liberal feminism because their
conception of feminism remains squarely focused on the individual, not the society, as the
primary subject of discussion. This, as will be discussed later, is the key distinction between
what I term dominance feminists and liberal feminists. Although Doezema and others take
issue with the inadequacy of the liberal definition of autonomy, are concerned about the
excessive reliance on the voluntary/forced dichotomy, and ultimately arrive at a number of
poststructuralist and antiessentialist conclusions, there is a connection with traditional
liberals because of their continued insistence that women’s choices to engage in sex work,
including migratory sex work, should be taken seriously. Yet their rejection of abstraction,
including the abstraction of autonomy, and focus on concrete experience is a fundamentally
antiessentialist turn. See Harris, supra note 84, at 588, 585 (rejecting “the pull of . . . the
voice of abstract categorization” and “the notion that a unitary, ‘essential’ women’s
experience can be isolated and described independently of discussing the importance of race,
class, sexual orientation, and other realities of experience”).
126. Doezema, supra note 37, at 42.
127. Id. at 34–35.
128. See id. at 45.
129. See id.
130. ELAINE JEFFREYS, CHINA, SEX AND PROSTITUTION 74 (2004) (noting the existence of
the virgin/whore complex).
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When consent is the basis of analysis, trafficked women can be framed in public
discourse as victims who are innocent of their own trafficking or entry into sex
work; by virtue of their lack of complicity, they therefore merit protection from the
government.131 Innocent trafficking victims stand in categorical opposition to the
guilty or complicit sex worker who chooses voluntarily to access trafficking
networks so she can engage in the sexual labor market.132 By framing these two
groups of trafficked women in opposition to one other and creating a public
discourse of victimization around the involuntarily trafficked category, the
voluntary migratory sex workers are excluded from public services offered to the
group defined as “trafficking victims.”133 In effect, this serves as a way to
distinguish deserving from undeserving victims in the sex-work realm: the
deserving victim is the one who lacked knowledge of the work she would do, while
the undeserving victim knowingly chose to do sex work and, therefore, “asked for”
any mistreatment that followed.134
In the policy arena, this distinction functions as a means test for the provision of
services to trafficked women.135 During the time I spent working in Italy with
trafficked Nigerian women, I was consistently disappointed that this was the litmus
test when seeking assistance for my clients. Social services centers time and again
asked if the women for whom I sought aid knew that they would do sex work prior
to arriving in Italy. Assistance was inevitably forthcoming for women whose
traffickers had defrauded them, while women who had chosen to migrate but then
found themselves trapped in an untenable situation of debt bondage were left to
their own devices.136 Prior knowledge separated those with access to social services
from those without such access. The contrast between the treatment of “innocent”
trafficked women and those who choose voluntarily to engage in the sexual labor
market is striking, and it demonstrates another way to deny women basic human
rights because, in this particular scenario, those who exercised agency were treated
as if they “deserved” the abuses they experienced. From a purely contractual vision

131. Doezema, supra note 37, at 45.
132. See Sally Cameron, Trafficking of Women for Prostitution, in TRAFFICKING IN
HUMAN$: SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS 80, 85–86 (Sally Cameron &
Edward Newman eds., 2008) (observing that the inherent exploitation in trafficking is
complicated by the reality of individual women’s agency).
133. This dynamic can be seen in the nature of public services offered in the United
States to victims of trafficking in persons as defined under the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act of 2000. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, 22
U.S.C. §§ 7101–12 (2006). Persons trafficked into any labor sector receive immigration
benefits, resettlement assistance, job training, and other social services. Id. § 7105. Women
trafficked into sexual labor are included in this group of recipients of aid, while women who
voluntarily engage in sexual labor are not. See id. §§ 7102, 7105.
134. Cameron, supra note 132, at 85 (“The simplistic view is that to be victimized one
must be ‘blameless’ in all regards.”).
135. Worse yet, where trafficked women exhibit agency, they can be treated as coconspirators in the crime of trafficking. Id.
136. I frequently responded to such a question with a nonresponsive question of my own:
Would anyone choose to do this? Usually, this question resulted in my clients receiving
services.
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of coercion, their consent to engagement in the sexual labor market served as a
blanket consent to any subsequent harms at the hands of their traffickers.137
Living in a social construction of sex work defined by the innocent/complicit
dichotomy also silences the independent, complicating voices of the sex workers
whose experiences the framework categorizes. The situation of the “rescue” of the
Shan women from the Thai brothel highlights the impact of this dynamic.138
Justifying the brothel raid as the rescue of trafficked minors trapped in a situation
of compelled prostitution, the organizations that implemented the raid overlooked
the majority of the women in the brothel who wanted to remain there. In part, the
intentional disregard for the wishes of the voluntary sex workers was an outgrowth
of an abolitionist viewpoint that the women could not consent to any kind of sex
work.
A more insidious interpretation of this raid is that it stood in reckless disregard
of these women’s choices altogether. The interactions of the authorities with the
women who were voluntarily present in the brothel represent more than an
overblown abolitionist effort to protect these women. It was in fact an intentional
effort to ignore their wishes. In effect, the choices of these women whose volitional
engagement in sex work was known, constrained as they were by the situations that
motivated them to migrate for sex work, warranted less respect than the abuses of
the purported minors who were also present. The innocent/complicit dichotomy
focuses on the abridgment of the autonomy of the innocent by coercing her into
sexual labor. Yet this focus simultaneously creates a necessary condition of
negating the choices of women who voluntarily make sexual labor their living. It
names women victims when they may not choose this label for themselves.139
When women resist the label of victim, this discourse of innocence and complicity
disregards them altogether.
Other theorists within the sex-worker-rights movement take this argument a step
further than merely an effort to respect the choices of women who do sex work, and
begin to identify the ways in which this kind of work offers liberation to the women
who do it. The argument, however, differs significantly from the sex-radical
understanding of the liberatory nature of sexual labor,140 which focuses on sex

137. This dichotomy pervades feminist analyses of sex-related oppression. When a
woman asks a rapist to use a condom, or even uses birth control at all, her contemplation of
the possibility of sexual contact is sufficient for her to be treated as culpable for the
occurrence of the contact, even when she has explicitly not consented to the contact itself.
See generally Carla M. da Luz & Pamela C. Weckerly, Recent Development, The Texas
‘Condom-Rape’ Case: Caution Construed as Consent, 3 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 95 (1993);
Donna J. Case, Comment, Condom or Not, Rape is Rape: Rape Law in the Era of AIDS—
Does Condom Use Constitute Consent?, 19 DAYTON L. REV. 227 (1993).
138. See supra notes 1–29 and accompanying text.
139. See Nicola Gavey, “I Wasn’t Raped, but . . .”: Revisiting Definitional Problems in
Sexual Victimization, in NEW VERSIONS OF VICTIMS: FEMINISTS STRUGGLE WITH THE
CONCEPT 57, 67 (Sharon Lamb ed., 1999) (discussing the problems with victim identification
and self-identification in the context of questions of narrative, rape, consent, and power).
140. Carol Queen, Sex Radical Politics, Sex-Positive Feminist Thought, and Whore
Stigma, in WHORES AND OTHER FEMINISTS, supra note 93, at 125, 127.
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workers’ subversive use of sexual power in a patriarchal society.141 Whereas some
migrant sex workers conceive of the possibility of sexual liberation through their
work, of greater interest to this analysis is the possibility of liberation from other
forms of oppression for migrant sex workers. Gail Pheterson, for example,
recognizes that for many women, particularly those in developing states, their lives
are often lived in situations of both gendered and economic oppression from which
they seek liberation.142
Yet for such women, these kinds of oppression do not merely function as social
problems, but as a political, class-based violation of women’s human rights
intended to maintain women in a position of political subjugation.143 In cases where
this is an accurate description of women’s condition, Pheterson argues that
migration can serve as a resistance strategy to the gendered oppression that women
experience in their daily lives.144 I would expand this analysis to include the
oppression that women experience on the basis of race or indigeneity, which again
can be pervasive elements in the narrative of women’s oppression in societies
worldwide.
This description applies, for example, in the case of the Shan women depicted at
the beginning of this Article. In the situations of the women described in that
narrative, the government targets them in a gendered manner by oppressing them
through sexual abuse, but does so because of their membership in the indigenous,
ethnic Shan group. For these women, to remove themselves from the state that
perpetrates such harms to a state where they have more control over their daily
existence is a resistance strategy. It marks a form of struggle against the economic
oppression that coexists with ethnic and racial domination, by demonstrating
economic capacity outside the limitations imposed by a brutal military regime.145
Yet while this resistance strategy may appear subversive, it is more in line with a

141. An entire literature and a set of strip clubs have grown up around the possibility of
sexual performance as liberation or resistance. Annie Sprinkle is one sexual performance
artist whose work is often noted. See, e.g., Linda Williams, A Provoking Agent: The
Pornography and Performance Art of Annie Sprinkle, 37 SOC. TEXT 117 (1993). The Lusty
Lady, a unionized strip club in San Francisco, remains another locale where sexual
performance liberation is discussed in the context of workers’ rights. Glen Martin, S.F. Strip
Club Ratifies Union—First in U.S., S.F. CHRON., Apr. 11, 1997, at A19. Finally, the rise of
competitive pole dancing indicates how notions of liberating, and even athletic, sexual
performance have gone mainstream. See USPDF Championship 2011 Ticket Sales, U.S.
POLE DANCING FEDERATION, http://uspoledance.com/Video_uspdfChampionship.php.
142. PHETERSON, supra note 113, at 101–02.
143. See id. at 102.
144. See id.
145. See id. In this regard, the commercialization of sex can be described as what
Kathryn Abrams calls resistant self-direction, which is typified by women’s efforts “simply
to pursue their own choices and plans in contexts where doing so evokes serious genderbased challenge.” Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency: Feminist Perspectives on
Self-Direction, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 832 (1999). Resistant self-direction, according
to Abrams, is not always explicit and thus sometimes is not recognized as resistance, despite
women’s efforts to “negotiate gender-based obstacles in order to achieve their larger goals.”
Id. at 833. For a helpful discussion of resistance strategies and their role in avoiding
essentialism, see also Harris, supra note 84, at 612.
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traditional, liberal model of encountering and overcoming oppression. Here,
trafficked women simply seek equality—equality of access to migration channels,
equality of employment opportunity, equality of admission to a nondomestic
economy—as freedom from the economic insecurity that plagues subsistence
farming households worldwide.146 Trafficked women who choose to be trafficked
are coping by accessing a type of practical equality of opportunity, which is a
traditionally liberal goal. Migrant sex workers do not seek to exert their sexuality
subversively through performance in response to oppression. Rather, they sell it
because it is the one commodity they possess that will fetch a price, and in earning
that wage, they subvert a system that denies them economic privilege.147
B. The Weaknesses of Feminist Sex-Work-Rights Advocacy
in the Realm of Trafficking
While these positions on sex work and trafficking offer the possibility of
reconceptualizing sex work and the status of sex workers, they are also fraught with
problems. One glaring issue, particularly in the writings of some first-world liberal
feminists such as Martha Nussbaum, is the pervasive assertion that sexual labor is
just another kind of work. Beginning with the premise that all forms of work
require the sale of some use of the body, Nussbaum, for example, offers an
explanation of how sexual labor is similar to and differs from other kinds of
work.148 She compares sex work to other kinds of labor, including as examples the
jobs of a factory worker at a poultry processing plant, a philosophy professor, and a
masseuse, among others.149 She engages in this exercise in an effort to undermine
some of the stigma attached to sexual labor, trying to show that other lines of work,
like sex work, have both positive and negative attributes. Nussbaum’s ultimate
goal, however, is to demonstrate that the widespread stigmatization of sex work as
an undignified line of work is an irrational attachment to a puritanical notion of sex.
Nussbaum is correct to identify the ways that sex work has been the subject of
stigma and that the cost of stigmatization has been levied on the women who do the
work.150 Basic worker rights, as Nussbaum accurately suggests, would provide

146. See Kempadoo, supra note 111, at 3–4 (discussing the income generation that leads
third-world women to perform sex work).
147. It is not uncommon for women to feel a great sense of pride in their own selfsufficiency in generating income for perhaps the first time. Lilya 4-Ever is a film that
documents a sex worker’s sense of accomplishment in her own earning power. In this
fictional film about the trafficking of a young woman, Lilya, from a former Soviet republic
to Sweden, one observes the shame of the protagonist when she enters the local convenience
store and lacks the money to purchase the few groceries she had selected. After selling sex
for the first time out of economic desperation and retching with revulsion at the act, Lilya
enters the same store, fills a basket with groceries, and grins when paying in large bills.
LILYA 4-EVER (Memfis Film 2002).
148. NUSSBAUM, supra note 92, at 276, 280–85.
149. For a more detailed description of the specifics of this example, see supra note 92.
150. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 92, at 285–86. Jody Freeman, while critical of liberal
feminists’ treatment of sex work, likewise argues that in Canada, where prostitution is legal
but all surrounding activity is illegal, “[t]he threat of prosecution and the stigma attached to
prostitution undoubtedly make it difficult for prostitutes to organize and impossible for them
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substantial improvement in the lot of sex workers.151 Yet without waxing in the
direction of dominance feminist theory on the violence and oppression that are
endemic to prostitution, it is reasonable to say that prostitution, as it currently
exists, is an unusually dangerous profession for most women who engage in it.
Even ensuring basic workers’ rights for sex workers—say, through wage and hour
laws and workplace safety measures—still cannot inoculate sex work from its
inherent dangers as compared to other kinds of work. Improvements might be
made, but the risk endemic to sex work will remain.
Understanding the potential dangers of sex work does not require a complex
thought experiment. Ten years ago, it was common for Nigerian women who had
been trafficked to Italy to wait along the sides of roads winding between towns in
Tuscany and Umbria in order to sell sex to passersby.152 These women would ride
the interurban bus to their appointed hairpin turn in the morning, wait throughout
the day seated on a folding chair for their clients to stop in their cars, and then, as
the last bus of the afternoon arrived, hide their folding chair in the underbrush in a
hurry to catch the last ride home. If these women had been selling sodas or
sandwiches along the roads between hill towns, they would not have encountered
the same level of threat. Performing work that requires the laborer to strip naked
and render herself vulnerable to her customers simply involves a higher level of
risk than fully clothed employment options.153 Regulation cannot resolve all of the
dangers of sex work, though it can improve working conditions in some
circumstances.
Certainly, there are more dangerous lines of work, some of which threaten
similar kinds of risks as those specific to sex work. Yet sex work, particularly the
migrant sex work that is at issue in most trafficking situations, is the instance of the
intersection of multiple forms of oppression with the real possibility of serious
harm for the women who engage in it. Some sex workers assert that sex work is a
liberatory way to reclaim sexual agency for women, and some women who make
these claims are migrant sex workers from developing countries.154 But most
women who are publicly engaged in this kind of sex-radical effort in the sexworker-rights movement are from developed contexts;155 economic necessity may
to seek the protection of the police when they are victims of crime.” Freeman, supra note 99,
at 82.
151. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 92, at 298.
152. This observation is based upon my time living in Arezzo, Italy, during August and
September of 2000.
153. These risks of physical danger are real. Melissa Farley, Prostitution, Trafficking,
and Cultural Amnesia: What We Must Not Know in Order to Keep the Business of Sexual
Exploitation Running Smoothly, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 109, 111 (2006) (identifying sex
workers as vulnerable to “intimate partner violence by customers as well as pimps” and
asserting that “[p]imps and customers use methods of coercion and control like those of
other batterers: economic exploitation, social isolation, verbal abuse, threats, physical
violence, sexual assault, captivity, minimization and denial of their use of physical violence
and abuse”).
154. Cf. supra note 142 and accompanying text.
155. The sex-worker-activist-scholars who contributed to Jill Nagle’s exemplary 1997
book Whores and Other Feminists, supra note 93, are primarily first-world women writing
about their experiences in sex work and the liberating effects of such labor. While Annie
Sprinkle’s revolutionary work on de-stigmatizing sexual labor is important to the first-world
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have motivated their entry into sex work, but the kind of complex migration issues
that underscore trafficking are not usually implicated.
A more fundamental critique is often leveled at liberal feminists, arising from
the long-standing debate around the intersection of feminism and classical
liberalism. Some, perhaps many, feminist scholars support the claim that no liberal
position can be feminist because it would not reflect the constraints of social
influence and structure.156 Because liberals view the individual as the actor of
concern, liberalism is often criticized for its failure to contextualize the individual
in society.157 Inherent in this critique of liberal feminism is the concept that a
feminist position is one that offers a society-based critique of the operation of
gender relations, rather than one born from in the rights of an individual.158 Even
archetypal feminist liberal thinkers like Martha Nussbaum have addressed this
issue, with an effort to frame much of their writing from an internationalist,
humanist perspective that is concerned with the social shaping of preference and
sex-worker rights movement, it is not necessarily an accurate description of the experiences
of all women in the sexual services industry who seek radical change to their profession.
Whereas sex-worker rights movements of the global North leverage sexually ironic or
gender-role subversive performance in commentary on social norms and constraints, thirdworld sex-worker movements tend toward more populist kinds of interventions. In the sense
that these women assert their choice to engage in sex work, and request respect as
professionals, it parallels the North American and European sex-radical movements. But
unlike these movements, third-world sex workers tend not to emphasize the performative,
sexually subversive elements of the work. Rather, they look more like factory workers
attempting to organize for labor rights. The most radical sex-worker movements in
developing contexts seek unionization, labor rights, education, credit facilities, vocational
training, and health care. The difference then is not merely of degree but of kind; for
radicalized third-world sex workers, commodified sexual activity is much more about
economic than sexual liberation. For detailed, firsthand accounts of third-world organizing
efforts and the kinds of collective actions workers take, see, for example, Angelita Abad,
Marena Briones, Tatiana Cordero, Rosa Manzo & Marta Marchán, The Association of
Autonomous Women Workers, Ecuador: “22nd June,” in GLOBAL SEX WORKERS: RIGHTS,
RESISTANCE, AND REDEFINITION, supra note 37, at 172 (discussing organizing in Ecuador);
Claudia Colimoro, A World of People: Sex Workers in Mexico, in GLOBAL SEX WORKERS:
RIGHTS, RESISTANCE, AND REDEFINITION, supra note 37, at 197–99 (interviewed by Amalia
Lucia Cabezas) (discussing organizing in Mexico); Shane A. Petzer & Gordon M. Issacs,
SWEAT: The Development and Implementation of a Sex Worker Advocacy and Intervention
Program in Post-Apartheid South Africa (with Special Reference to the Western City of
Cape Town), in GLOBAL SEX WORKERS: RIGHTS, RESISTANCE, AND REDEFINITION, supra note
37, at 192 (discussing organizing in South Africa).
156. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 99, at 75 n.2, 89.
157. Id. at 87 (“Feminist theory and critical legal studies have attempted to expose the
inability of liberal theory to account for our connections to others, or our ‘social
constitutiveness.’ The central features of liberalism—the public/private distinction, a highly
individualistic conception of rights—are commonly attacked as inappropriate for, and
unresponsive to, feminist demands for equality and freedom.”).
158. Indeed, some feminist scholars working in the liberal tradition posit that patriarchal
bias is inherent in liberal political theory and describe liberal feminism as, at best, an
oxymoron. See, e.g., ZILLAH R. EISENSTEIN, THE RADICAL FUTURE OF LIBERAL FEMINISM 5–9
(1981) (developing the concept of liberal feminism as problematic and potentially
contradictory).
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desire as well as with sympathetic understanding.159 This answer is helpful insofar
as it addresses the most egregious shortcomings of traditional liberal theory;
Nussbaum holds herself to a rigorous model of the liberal individual as engaged in
society, and, thus, she escapes some of the most common critiques of liberalism.160
But the problem remains that the individual functions as the primary subject of
liberal feminist inquiry, and society-wide or class concerns are relevant for their
impact on the individual. Social factors may cause some of the problems that the
individual woman encounters, but liberal feminist theorizing engages society
through the individual, not from an independent social critique. Because of this,
liberal feminism, even when Nussbaum stretches it skillfully, cannot offer a cogent,
self-sufficient theory of social oppression of women as a class, even a
nonmonolithic one.
Sex-worker-rights advocates, including Doezema and Kempadoo, are not
subject to the same kind of criticism of the basis of their feminist selfidentification. In part, this seems to be because activist-scholars like these address
trafficking from a position of claiming the rights of individual sex workers rather
than offering a more sweeping theory of the feminist significance of prostitution, as
Nussbaum articulates. Another factor that inoculates such work from the critiques
that traditional liberal feminist scholars encounter is the centering of individual
experience in the theoretical project.161
The centrality of coercion to liberal feminist thought on trafficking is also
potentially problematic. At times, the discussion of coercion tends toward a narrow,
legalistic definition of the concept. Reliance on a strict form of coercion as the
dispositive element of a case of trafficking is problematic, although this is precisely
the codified vision of what sex trafficking is: sex work under coercion. Consent, as
defined in the Trafficking Protocol, is insufficient to override the coercion that

159. NUSSBAUM, supra note 88, at 6.
160. Unlike historical liberal political philosophers, Nussbaum envisions a liberal
individual who exists in community and society, not in atomistic isolation. See id. at 10–11.
161. To appreciate the ways in which the experiences of individuals can be centered in
broader considerations of trafficking, see generally GLOBAL SEX WORKERS: RIGHTS,
RESISTANCE, AND REDEFINITION, supra note 37. But what to call this generation of sexworker-rights advocates is a puzzle. The epistemological claim that the lives of women
generate the fodder for theoretical development is closely associated with the
poststructuralist movement. See Harris, supra note 84, at 585. Yet, although this group of
activist-scholars offers a theory of trafficking with greater attention to the role of social
systems in the life of the individual sex worker than a traditional liberal feminist, the
individual as a constituent member of a social class remains the central element of the
theory. Furthermore, the sex-worker-advocate orientation envisions an individual who is
influenced by social pressures but ultimately acts as a unitary agent, even while engaging in
the kind of social-movement work that these authors espouse. At the foundational level, both
traditional liberals and contemporary sex-worker-rights advocates focus on the rights of the
individual migrant sex worker, as animated by the choices of the individual. Most
importantly, the individual’s experience of coercion, whether at the hand of a trafficker or
under the influence of an oppressive society, shapes the contours of each theory. So although
the theories differ in key ways, they are rooted in a similar understanding of the sex worker
as an individual agent of her own life, who acts within society in furtherance of her own,
self-defined goals. This conception of the individual ultimately has some liberal origins.
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defines a trafficking case.162 Yet the vision of coercion contained in the
international definition is perhaps too weak of an understanding of coercive force in
the lives of women who experience domination on the basis of sex, race, thirdworld disadvantage, indigeneity, or some combination thereof.
Martha Nussbaum’s vision of coercion163 is worth repeating here. Although a
traditional liberal model of coercion would require some kind of explicit force or
fraud, a more nuanced, feminist understanding of coercion acknowledges the
coercive force of societal oppression. This is consistent with Nussbaum’s
intentional rejection of the atomistic vision of the individual and her appreciation
for the context in which the individual lives;164 it is also represented in the thought
of Doezema, Kempadoo, and their contemporaries, who all reject a vision of
women’s choices as occurring in a vacuum.165 While this mode of thought accounts
for the social nature of coercion, none of these theorists believe it worthwhile to
undermine an individual woman’s agency in order to protect her from systemic,
categorical oppression.
However, the entire concept of coercion, even where broadened to allow for the
impact of diffuse social pressures, is still predicated on the impact of coercive
pressure on the individual. A focus on coercion requires a close examination of
individual choices, which implicates society as a corollary matter. Yet coercion, as
envisioned by the theorists here discussed, is defined by its impact on individuals,
not by its social nature. One can imagine ubiquitous, subtle, and hidden results of
social oppression that pressure individuals in a coercive manner, but that are not
identified as coercion either because no specific persons are aware of the
experience of coercion or because the coercion is such a pervasive element within
society that it evades observation. So whereas liberal feminists leave theoretical
space for this kind of “soft,” social-pressure coercion, in some cases, it would seem
to escape their notice, as they rely on the individual as the touchstone of assessing
coercion.166 Sex-worker-rights advocates similarly look at individual experience as
the ruler for measuring coercion.

162.
163.
164.
165.

Trafficking Protocol, supra note 6, at art. 3(b).
See generally supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text.
See NUSSBAUM, supra note 88, at 10–11.
See, e.g., Kamala Kempadoo, Introduction: Globalizing Sex Workers’ Rights, in
GLOBAL SEX WORKERS: RIGHTS, RESISTANCE, AND REDEFINITION, supra note 37, at 17–19.
166. Susan Moller Okin has offered a careful and nuanced assessment of how feminist
theory can account for this kind of soft, diffuse coercion without resorting to a strict notion
of false consciousness. Susan Moller Okin, Reply, in IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR
WOMEN? 117, 126 (Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1999).
Okin discusses the observation that women sometimes express preferences for antifeminist,
subordinating social choices, which she terms adaptive preferences, by noting that “[o]ne
need not rely on the Marxist theory of false consciousness to recognize that persons
subjected to unjust conditions often adapt their preferences so as to conceal the injustice of
their situation from themselves.” Id. She continues by considering that older women in a
patriarchal culture tend not to want change because it is difficult to question cultural
constraints and because their roles might depend on successful enculturation of younger
people, particularly daughters-in-law, to performance of traditional, patriarchal social roles.
Id.
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Leaving theoretical space for the soft coercion of social forces still does not
bring these generally liberal theorists to a systematic understanding of the
oppression that trafficked women experience as a class. Foregrounding coercion
requires explicit focus on the individual, as well as the theoretical construction of
society-wide oppression as the sum of individual experiences, not as a pervasive
element of a society itself. Thus, while a collection of individual experiences can
generate a societal conceptualization of oppression as the source of coercion, it
does not necessarily do so. A broad-based critique of the limits of sexist society can
result from the liberal identification of coercion, but it does not automatically
follow from a liberal notion of coercion; the liberal theory of the individual may
actually make it harder to identify patterns of coercion within groups of individuals.
Because of this attachment to the individual as the basis of liberal theory and the
possibility that coercion will not be subject to collective analysis, liberal feminist
thought on trafficking often lacks the kind of expansive social critique that seeks to
explain the occurrence of trafficking and the possibilities for its eradication.
III. HARMONIZING FEMINIST APPROACHES TO TRAFFICKING: THIRD-WAY FEMINISM
In the context of trafficking for sexual purposes, political pragmatism and
feminist commitment to social change that improves the lot of women demand
efforts to bring opposing organizations into dialogue. While liberal and dominance
feminists engage in a public policy death match for theoretical primacy, women
trafficked for sexual purposes continue to face the tangible harms that purportedly
concern these feminists. Even for those who expressly reject feminism but are
concerned with human suffering in general, this ideological conflict poses a
problem, insofar as it exhausts valuable energy that might be invested in aiding
people in need.167 The kinds of situations described in the introduction, in which
activists, governments, and social-service providers subjugate the needs of
particular trafficked women in the pursuit of ideological warfare in the publicpolicy realm, have proven inconsistent with ardent advocacy for trafficked women
that focuses on concrete interventions. How we have thought about trafficking for
sexual purposes has inhibited what we have been able to do about it.168 The
following proposed harmonization of these two theories thus serves the pragmatic

167. To the extent that this conflict over the meaning of sex work distracts from more
constructive, pragmatic discourse on trafficking into all labor sectors, resolving this problem
pays dividends when trying to generate cogent public policy interventions in situations of
trafficking for other forms of labor as well. Chang & Kim, supra note 15, at 318–19 (noting
the U.S. government’s focus on sex trafficking and ongoing ignorance of “trafficking into
agriculture, domestic service, restaurants, hotels, manufacturing, and construction” and
observing that the “emphasis on criminal enforcement and antiprostitution policies curtails
the rights of trafficked persons voluntarily engaged as sex workers, and marginalizes
trafficked persons in non-sex related industries”).
168. See, e.g., Dina Francesca Haynes, (Not) Found Chained to a Bed in a Brothel:
Conceptual, Legal, and Procedural Failures to Fulfill the Promise of the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 337, 351 (2007) (observing the U.S. response to
trafficking by noting that if the government insists on rescuing girls chained to beds in
brothels, it will overlook the vast majority of trafficked persons in the country).
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goal of implementing effective public policies that might obviate the need for
continued infighting in the anti-trafficking community. A third way between these
two feminist accounts of trafficking seeks to harness the analytical strengths of
each in order to avoid the perils of the other. Finally, while the foregoing
descriptions are offered in theoretical terms, this harmonized account of a feminist
theory of trafficking for sexual purposes resonates with specific, practical publicpolicy interventions because it is a practical, rather than normative, project.
A. Third-Way Feminism: A Practical Middle Ground
There are shortcomings to both major theoretical approaches to the trafficking of
women for sexual purposes. As described above, dominance feminism mutes the
voices of sex workers who would offer an alternative vision of their sexual labor.
Through its monolithic conflation of voluntary and involuntary sex work and its
refusal to consider the dissenting views of individual women, it obliterates the
possibility of sexual labor serving any kind of liberatory purpose in the lives of
women.169 On the other hand, because of the liberal conception of the individual as
the subject of questions of political philosophy, liberal feminists cannot offer a rich
account of the societal structures and pressures that shape women’s experience in
the public labor market. This shortcoming has its most critical expression in the
excessive liberal dependence on an individually determined vision of coercion,
which relies narrowly on the experiences of individual women rather than offering
a more visionary critique of the systematized nature of the oppression of women
along axes of gender, race, and indigeneity.
Yet both major strains of theory offer significant and powerful contributions to a
complete understanding of trafficking for sexual purposes. Kathleen Barry’s
dominance feminist model portrays the depth of sex-based domination that is at the
root of the trafficking of women for sexual purposes; she offers a scathing critique
of a world that relegates many women to a life-long position of oppression, with
sexual labor as one of few economically viable fields of work.170 Her theory
expresses a deep understanding of the similarity of the lives of many women and of
how these experiences are part of their class-based condition. At the other extreme,
the liberal attachment to the individual allows room for the ambiguity and
complexity of individual women’s experiences; it does not force the discrete voices
of particular women to conform to a monolithic theory of what trafficking for
sexual purposes means from a feminist perspective. Furthermore, the
poststructuralist conception of the individual allows greater appreciation of the
ways in which different women experience oppression along distinct axes.
Together, liberal and poststructuralist feminisms allow room for women to name
and define their own oppression, and to suggest what kinds of solutions they need
to solve the problems they perceive in their own lives.171

169. Kamala Kempadoo, Women of Color and the Global Sex Trade: Transnational
Perspectives, MERIDIANS, Spring 2001, at 28, 28.
170. See supra notes 37–73 and accompanying text.
171. Sex workers themselves have identified space between victimhood and agency in
which they live and work. Travis S.K. Kong, What It Feels Like for a Whore: The Body
Politics of Women Performing Erotic Labour in Hong Kong, 13 GENDER, WORK & ORG. 409
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A middle way between these two opposing theoretical positions must embrace
the strengths of both models, using each theory to bolster the other in substantive
ways. If reconciled, the liberal appreciation for individual experience and the
poststructuralist awareness of the need for individualized intervention can resolve
the flaws of dominance feminism’s universalized account. Similarly, reconciling
aspects of liberalism and dominance theory permits the use of the class-based
analysis of dominance feminism to overcome the liberal failure to provide a cogent
description of the social nature of the oppressions that cause trafficking. Such
complementary work has been performed, but primarily at a theoretical level, in the
current dialogue around the issue of partial agency within the law, which hints at
what a concretized version of the theory might resemble in the context of legal and
policy reform.172
Yet the third-way feminist approach that I advocate differs from the existing
theories in important ways. First, it is context specific. Whereas scholars such as
Kathryn Abrams develop a multipurpose account of women’s agency that can be
imported into discussions of feminist legal theory as applied to any substantive area
of law,173 the present model, as offered here, is specific to the issue of trafficking
for sexual purposes. Second, the instant account finds normative mandate in the
widespread ideological conflict that creates chaos of concrete trafficking
interventions. Thus, its impetus resides outside the realm of theory and squarely
inside that of public policy and law. Although it describes in great detail the
generative theoretical accounts of trafficking that underlie present political
positions, here the theory serves to clarify the normative positions underlying
particular forms of policy advocacy; this project, at its essence, is pragmatic and
seeks ideological unity among bickering organizations. Abrams, in contrast, finds
epistemological origins in theory, from which she generates policy.174 Both are
endeavors of feminist legal theory; yet, as they take their cues from different
sources, they conclude in different places. Abrams’s project provides a thorough
but generalist approach for feminist law and policy making;175 the task of this
Article is to frame a theoretical model of trafficking for sexual purposes that is
generative of interventions acceptable to all feminists. In short, this project takes up
Abrams’s suggestion to “address[ ] particular controversies as they arise.”176

(2006) (documenting this complexity through a series of in-depth individual interviews with
sex workers in Hong Kong).
172. See Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal
Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304, 351–53 (1995) (discussing partial agency from the
standpoint of analyzing the nature of the legal subject). While the first step in such a project
is defining the nature of the subject, Abrams delineates a clear space for carrying such
theoretical discussions into the realm of concrete controversies. See infra note 176 and
accompanying text.
173. Abrams, supra note 172, at 355 (“I will classify these approaches by the type of
strategy they involve—the particular use that they propose to make of legal rules and/or
imagery—rather than by the area(s) of substantive law to which they apply.”).
174. See generally id. at 351–76.
175. See id. at 355.
176. Id. (“[T]he agency critique would seem to point toward a strategic or pragmatic
approach that addresses particular controversies as they arise, in light of more generally
shared goals.” (internal citation omitted)).
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B. Third-Way Feminism’s Four Central Tenets
With regard to the trafficking of women for sexual purposes and migration for
sexual labor, four central tenets serve to describe in broad strokes a feminist third
way. First, the theoretical harmonization of dominance and liberal feminism in the
context of the trafficking of women and migration for sexual labor would adopt the
dominance feminist cognizance of the system of oppression in which individual
women make choices. Particularly in the case of international migration for sexual
labor, the reality is that many women encounter intersecting oppressions on a daily
basis; racism, sexism, discrimination on the basis of indigenous status, classism,
and myriad other forms of oppression are part of life for women worldwide and
pervade women’s conceptualization of their life choices. In a third-way theory,
prioritizing an overarching awareness of the systematic nature of how privilege
structures opportunity is a tribute to dominance feminism’s effort to describe a
world of sexualized domination. Indeed, the key contribution of dominance
feminism to this third-way model of trafficking is its profound sociological insight
into the structural aspects of gender and power, which cannot be fully understood
by looking at individuals, but rather requires a broad, even globalizing, analysis.
Interventions that forward this tenet happen society-wide, likely in institutional
spheres, and seek to systematically deconstruct laws supportive of continued
oppressive circumstances.
Second, a harmonized feminism attempts to explain and counteract the impact
of multiple forms of oppression on the lives of women. This theory of oppression
draws on the strength of dominance feminism in perceiving oppressions from a
social, rather than individual, perspective. Yet where dominance feminism breaks
down due to its universalizing that refuses to accept the multiplicity of oppressions
that shape women’s lives, the poststructuralist model of intersecting oppressions
presents an alternative method of comprehending oppressions as uniquely
experienced by individuals. The third-way theory of trafficking for sexual purposes
accounts for the class-based nature of these oppressions. Barry’s influence is felt by
acknowledging that women as a group can be partially understood through an
explanation of oppression. Yet this third-way project also reflects the
poststructuralist awareness that because not all women experience each axis of
oppression, individuals’ needs and responses will differ. Interventions consistent
with this tenet offer women trafficked for sexual purposes opportunities,
information, and resources to overcome the power differentials inherent in these
intersecting oppressions, while refusing to mandate a monolithic, one-size-fits-all
intervention.
Third, a harmonized feminist account of trafficking does not subsume the
particularized experiences of individual women in the social explanation of the
nature of oppression. Space remains within this description of a shared, class-based
status for women to opt out. This tenet arises from the liberal feminist respect for
an individual’s ability to narrate her own story on her own terms. Interventions that
embrace this aspect of a third-way discourse on trafficking for sexual purposes
provide individual women opportunities to name the sources of their own
oppression, rather than defining the trafficking experience for them, and also to
coordinate anti-oppression efforts with others who self-identify as similarly
situated.
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Fourth, the harmonized feminist account of trafficking leaves open the
possibility of agentic177 action, even under oppression. Multiple oppressions are not
the sole defining characteristics of women’s existence under a third-way model of
trafficking for sexual purposes. Oppressions occur socially, and can be opposed
both socially and individually; the choice of how to oppose oppression remains
with individual women. This element of the project acknowledges that oppression’s
impact is far reaching, but strongly asserts women’s ability to stand in opposition to
oppression. This tenet of third-way feminist theory focuses on the need to
affirmatively increase women’s options for agentic action. Merely allowing space
for independent agentic action is insufficient; interventions that advance agentic
action leverage law and public policy to create legal channels in which women can
act on their own behalf.
C. Third-Way Feminist Sociolegal Interventions
These harmonized elements also point in the direction of the kind of sociolegal
interventions that best serve trafficked persons, while simultaneously avoiding each
theory’s primary pitfalls.
First, at least portions of both sides of the abolition/sex-worker-rights debate
advocate the decriminalization of prostitution,178 specifically by removing
engagement in sexual labor from the criminal code.179 This proposition alone would

177. This use of the term “agentic” invokes Amartya Sen’s use of the term “agent”
in its older—and “grander”—sense as someone who acts and brings about
change, and whose achievements can be judged in terms of her own values and
objectives, whether or not we assess them in terms of some external criteria as
well. This [theory] is particularly concerned with the agency role of the
individual as a member of the public and as a participant in economic, social
and political actions . . . .
AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 19 (1999). For example, in discussing the actions
of women in demanding wartime government accountability, Kathryn Abrams has written
that “women are playing an agentic part in managing the culturally-constructed
contradictions of their role. They are negotiating the balance between the gendered and the
gender-neutral in interesting and creative ways.” Kathryn Abrams, Lecture, Women and
Antiwar Protest: Rearticulating Gender and Citizenship, 87 B.U. L. REV. 849, 881 (2007).
178. Janet Halley, Prabha Kotiswaran, Hila Shamir, and Chantal Thomas describe four
ways in which the legal system can deal with sex work. Halley et al., supra note 24, at 338–
39. Complete criminalization criminalizes both the sale and purchase of sex. Id. Partial
decriminalization decriminalizes the actions of sex workers, but criminalizes the actions of
johns. Id. Complete decriminalization removes all criminal penalties from engagement in sex
work, though other kinds of criminal liability may attach to actions taken during the sale or
purchase of sex. Id. Finally, legalization involves complete decriminalization plus regulation
of sex work. Id.
179. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Prostitution and Civil Rights, in WOMEN’S LIVES,
MEN’S LAWS, supra note 36, at 151, 155 (“Criminal laws against prostitution make women
into criminals for being victimized as women, yet there are no cases challenging these laws
as sex discrimination on this ground. Criminal prostitution laws collaborate elaborately in
women’s social inequality; through them, the state enforces the exploitation of prostituted
women directly.” (internal citation omitted)); NUSSBAUM, supra note 92, at 296 (“Certainly
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make serious progress in both shifting the stigma of sex work, a priority of liberal
theorists, and reducing the likelihood of women’s victimization at the hands of
police operating within a system of sexualized dominance. Consistent with the four
tenets of third-way theory, decriminalization acknowledges the system of
oppression in which trafficked women live and reframes these women, at least in
part, either as victims of the crimes of traffickers or, in the alternative, as
individuals capable of asserting their own agentic choices. Decriminalization thus
offers the possibility of the neutrality of the law in its encounter with trafficked
women, rejecting a universal definition of the trafficked sex worker as criminal and
instead providing the opportunity for self-definition on the spectrum of agency and
victimhood.
Reform of police investigation and prosecution offers a more moderate and
perhaps more attainable third-way intervention, which similarly leverages change
to the perceived criminality of trafficking-related sex-work offenses.180 This kind of
restructuring is much more widespread in practice than the kind of
decriminalization typically advocated in the literature, and, similarly, attempts to
protect individual trafficked women from specific harms at the hands of police and
prosecutors that follow from the stigma of sex work. Yet, unlike full-fledged
decriminalization, more moderate interventions do not pose the problem of
offending local mores and social norms regarding sex work in the same way that
complete decriminalization does.181 Either decriminalization or reform is consistent
with third-way feminist values, but reform might be preferable for pragmatic
reasons.
Reforms of this kind can be found when police officers and agencies opt to work
outside formal legal structures to help social-service providers work with trafficked
[the economic situation of women] will not be ameliorated by the criminalization of
prostitution, which reduces poor women’s options still further.”). But see Janice G.
Raymond, Ten Reasons for Not Legalizing Prostitution and a Legal Response to the Demand
for Prostitution, 2 J. OF TRAUMA PRAC. 315, 316 (2003) (arguing against the legalization of
sex work because it would legitimate “prostitution as work [and make] the harm of
prostitution to women invisible, expand[] the sex industry, and [fail to] empower the women
in prostitution”).
180. This vision of intervention in trafficking in the criminal sphere reflects both the
trend toward governance feminism, critically described as the “infiltration of specifically
feminist activism into generalist forms of power-wielding,” Halley et al., supra note 24, at
343 (emphasis omitted), as well as the current pushback by feminists who challenge the cooptation of feminist power by the police state, Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on
Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581, 653 (2009) (leveling this critique in the arena of rape laws).
The rejection of the absolute reliance on police power to create change is one of the
emerging neofeminist principles. Gruber et al., supra note 31.
181. Where efforts to decriminalize prostitution have occurred in the United States, they
have been opposed in many instances. See, e.g., John M. Glionna, Proposition to Protect Sex
Work Splits S.F.: Backers Say Measure Would Help Public Health, Foes Contend It Will
Attract Criminals, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, at A2 (quoting Kamala Harris, San Francisco
District Attorney, on the topic of a decriminalization proposition, stating that “Prostitution is
not a victimless crime. . . . It’s a crime that victimizes neighborhoods and plagues
communities and compromises the quality of life of the people who live in those
neighborhoods. This measure would prohibit us from putting public resources into helping
those residents. And that’s not acceptable in this community.”).
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women. The interventions of a handful of officers in an Italian police force offer
one example of this in practice.182 Without the knowledge of the majority of the
department, a few officers assisted local service organizations with removing
individual women from trafficking situations. This aid typically came in the form
of falsified arrests or deportations. A few officers would coordinate efforts with
social-service providers to stage false police confrontations with local trafficked
women. Those who wanted to return home to their families in Nigeria would have
deportations fabricated and would return voluntarily; those who wanted to stay in
Italy, but feared reprisals from traffickers, could assert an Italian law that granted
residency to those who testified against their traffickers, and then would use a
falsified arrest as the impetus to move to a social-service center or convent at the
opposite end of the country, away from the community where their identities were
known. These women would be free from their contracts, in most cases, once
“deported” or “arrested,” which was a self-serving response that divested madams
and traffickers of any sense of responsibility for the trafficked woman once she
encountered legal trouble.
Such a solution to the intractable dilemma of how to get already-trafficked
women out of their situations recognizes key shortcomings in the ability of the state
to offer meaningful interventions for trafficked women; it thus operates cognizant
of the social nature of trafficking and the societal obstacles that prevent women
from leaving trafficking. The corruption of local officers and their collaboration
with traffickers meant that universal access to state assistance in leaving trafficked
sex work was an impossibility; crooked officers would simply tip off traffickers so
they could remove their sex workers from the city in anticipation of police action.
Further, implementation of this strategy highlighted the insufficiency of both
national and international legal coordination in offering protection to women who
would try voluntarily to leave trafficked sex work.
Beyond the pragmatism of this intervention, it also is consistent with the tenets
of a third-way consideration of trafficking. The police who helped trafficked
women in this way acted in knowledge that systematized oppression based on
gender, race, and national-origin privilege allowed corrupt police to take advantage
of trafficked women. Without these police officers’ insight into the pervasive,
structural aspects of gendered power, which derives in large part from dominance
feminist thought, such an intervention would not be possible. They refused to see
these women merely as individuals who had made bad choices and instead
appreciated them as persons stuck in a system that offered them few exit strategies.
The solution of falsified legal action offered a bypass around the institutional
structure that magnified the impacts of these oppressions on the lives of individual
women. Further, by allowing the individual women who were well-suited to this
kind of intervention to decide for themselves if and how they wanted to leave the
trafficking situation, the police embraced the agency of individuals to act on their
own behalf. Most importantly, these police used institutional resources to equalize
power differentials based in male and race privilege by offering women the
opportunity to choose to get out. Yet the police did not universalize the experience

182. This example was drawn from my own experience working in Italy in 2000–01.
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of individual women, instead generating context-specific, individualized plans that
could account for the particularity of a single woman’s experience.
Second, the creation of viable alternatives to sex work also follows necessarily
from a theory that requires offering possibilities for agentic action; entering a
trafficking situation can only be seen as an agentic life choice for women when it is
chosen from among other viable life options. Liberal scholars suggest possible
programs for increasing sex workers’ alternatives. Martha Nussbaum has
articulated four stages for addressing liberal concerns with prostitution:
1) provision of education to prostitutes and their children to increase their life
options; 2) provision of microcredit to women to increase their employment
options; 3) creation of labor unions for women in low-income jobs to create the
possibility of collective, agentic action; and 4) creation of groups to increase
women’s connectedness to one another.183 These suggestions closely parallel the
kinds of interventions that the activist-scholar group advocates for as well.184
Nussbaum’s proposals approach a third-way model, except that she does not
specify the relationship between her ideas and the social nature of gendered
oppression.
A third-way model might offer programmatic interventions similar to those of
Nussbaum but develop them with a specific eye to undermining systemic social
factors that render women susceptible to trafficking.185 These interventions take
their lead from a sociological observation of the systematic nature of the pervasive
lack of privilege among poor women of color in societies of the global South,
owing in large part to dominance feminist insights on structural aspects of gender
and power, but intervene in the lives of individuals in a fashion perhaps better
understood as liberal. Put another way, this kind of intervention leverages
dominance feminist social observations but enacts typically liberal solutions. The
American Himalayan Foundation offers an example of how these interventions

183. NUSSBAUM, supra note 92, at 296–97.
184. See supra note 155 (discussing organizing). Whether activist or scholar, that
Nussbaum and Doezema alike advocate for collective action by sex workers indicates that
women in situations of sex work might find strength in numbers. Simply stated, this kind of
group action by women, sex workers or not, is a well-documented way to produce the kind
of positive change in life circumstance that leads to improved social conditions. See, e.g.,
NUSSBAUM, supra note 7, at 15 (emphasizing the role of Indian women’s collective action in
improving their socioeconomic conditions).
185. Janie Chuang has offered a meaningful discussion of the factors creating
susceptibility to trafficking, observing that
[t]he problem of trafficking begins not with the traffickers themselves, but with
the conditions that caused their victims to migrate under circumstances
rendering them vulnerable to exploitation. Human trafficking is but “an
opportunistic response” to the tension between the economic necessity to
migrate, on the one hand, and the politically motivated restrictions on
migration, on the other.
Janie Chuang, Beyond a Snapshot: Preventing Human Trafficking in the Global Economy,
13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 137, 140 (2006). Chuang goes on to identify how migratory
push-pull factors function in the trafficking arena. Id. at 140–47. Dina Francesca Haynes has
made similar observations in her scholarship on trafficking. See Haynes, supra note 168, at
353–55.
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might be developed. One of their programs provides funds to keep Nepali girls in
school during the years they are most vulnerable to being trafficked or to migrating
to engage in sex work.186 It is an intervention that occurs at the level of the
individual, but is crafted and shaped according to social reality. Further, it is a
third-way feminist model because it explicitly acknowledges the intersecting
systems of gender, race, and class that deny female children in Nepali villages
access to education. It also views these systems with a forward-looking gaze,
recognizing that educated girls will raise the standard of living for the community
as a whole, and their families in particular, with the intent of solving the problem of
trafficking in the future.187 Yet it encounters these oppressions with an eye to the
empowerment of individual, specific girls, offering them viable future options of
agentic adult action, through which they might, if they choose, avoid lives of
commercial sex work. The American Himalayan Foundation takes seemingly
liberal interventions but contextualizes them in a profound understanding of
systematic social oppression, which they seek to overcome. Even more robust
interventions could involve paying formerly trafficked women who have since
graduated to be school teachers so they can earn a salary, or paying families some
kind of stipend on top of the scholarship for their daughters to overcome the
opportunity cost of having a girl in school instead of earning money for the
family’s support.
Third, any kind of direct intervention in a situation of sex work or trafficking
must be done in dialogue with the women in question. Public policy that ignores
the real needs of individual trafficked women does not show respect for the choices
of individual women. Yet recently developed domestic public-policy options
demonstrate how legal interventions can let individual trafficked persons shape
how they will pursue their own paths once they have successfully left a trafficking
situation. Advocates for trafficked persons successfully lobbied for the amendment
of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act with the inclusion of a civil remedy
provision in the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003.188
With access to a civil remedy, trafficked women need not rely solely on criminal
prosecution of their traffickers to see justice done. Prosecutorial discretion and
resources thus are not the only factors determining if a trafficking case of some
kind can be brought. Leveraging the lower standard of proof in civil litigation, civil
remedy actions allow individual women to seek money damages from their
traffickers directly, without concern for establishing the trafficking offense beyond
a reasonable doubt.

186. See
Projects:
Stop
Girl
Trafficking,
AM.
HIMALAYAN
FOUND.,
http://www.himalayan-foundation.org/live/project/stopgirltrafficking.
187. K. Subbarao & Laura Raney, Social Gains from Female Education: A CrossNational Study, 44 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 105, 105 (1995) (documenting, over
the period of 1970–85, that female secondary education has a very strong effect on fertility
and mortality and that family planning reduces fertility more when combined with female
education).
188. Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003 § 1595, Pub. L. No.
108-193, 177 Stat. 2876.
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More recently, the California Trafficking Victims’ Protection Act, passed in
2005, offers legal protection for the individual choices of trafficked women.189 It
too offers a civil remedy provision, and even more importantly, includes a human
trafficking caseworker provision, which defines the relationships that trafficked
individuals establish with their social-service caseworkers as privileged, much like
attorney-client relationships.190 Previously, traffickers’ defense attorneys could, in
their efforts to defend their clients, invade these relationships to access information
about the trafficking; the fact that they could be subpoenaed made caseworkers
uneasy about hearing full accounts of the trafficking, which reduced their
effectiveness in assisting their clients because of a lack of complete knowledge
about clients’ post-trafficking needs. Now, a privileged relationship means that
trafficked persons can feel safe seeking assistance through candid
communication.191 This provision operates to level, in part, the inequality that
trafficked persons experience from any of a number of axes of oppression. By
allowing women to seek assistance from those trained to offer information and
counsel, caseworker privilege means that social-service providers can maximize an
individual’s range of options and opportunity to express agency by equipping her to
make informed, individualized decisions about her subsequent actions, once free
from a trafficker’s control.
Legal solutions such as caseworker privilege or civil remedy provisions in
trafficking-related laws exemplify third-way intervention because they provide
systematic solutions that enlarge the scope of a particular woman’s autonomy.
They qualify as third-way interventions because they assist trafficked persons by
leveraging society-wide legislative change to alter systematized oppression, but
refuse to offer only unitary forms of intervention that universalize the experience of
trafficking. Instead, a legislative grant of the right to seek civil remedies offers
social change at a macro level while allowing women to assert their own rights
against traffickers, reclaiming the profits of their forced labor for their own benefit.
Caseworker privilege shifts the burdens and benefits of prosecution to support
women as they seek counsel and make choices from a position of information
rather than ignorance of the range of options available to them. In both cases, legal
interventions offer social change, which enables individual women to agentically
assert a self-defined vision of the good in their own lives.
A more extreme, nonlegal form of intervention in dialogue with trafficked
women is exorcism. Among Nigerian women trafficked to Italy, it is a common
experience to be taken to the local practitioner of the animistic, indigenous religion
by the trafficker prior to leaving a home village. There, the shaman casts a spell;192
using blood, pubic hair, and underpants, a woman is bound to her trafficker by this
curse, with various kinds of harm to follow for her or her family if she runs

189. California Trafficking Victims Protection Act, ch. 240, A.B. 22 (2005).
190. Id. at sec. 2, 52.5(a).
191. This is an observation from my work advocating for the California Trafficking
Victims Protection Act as a law student at Boalt Hall in the 2004–05 academic year.
192. See Aderanti Adepoju, Review of Research and Data on Human Trafficking in SubSaharan Africa, in DATA AND RESEARCH ON HUMAN TRAFFICKING: A GLOBAL SURVEY, supra
note 16, at 75, 86.
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away.193 From time to time, one Protestant minister who works with these women
engages in a practice of exorcism in which he frees his clients from the spells they
believe to oppress them.194 When asked to explain why he does this for the
Nigerian women who are his clients, as this pastor does not himself believe
exorcism to be occurring, his response is a profoundly third-way one: he does it
because the women themselves believe the spell to be the source of their
oppression. He intervenes with exorcism precisely because it subverts the
systematized oppression that these women seek to overcome in order to be freed
from their circumstances.
Even this kind of nonlegal solution is third way because it balances recognition
of social sources of oppression—here, culturally specific religious belief—with the
lived oppression of an individual. This pastor does not exorcise each of his clients,
but only those who identify the voodoo spell as an obstacle to leaving trafficked
sex work. In this sense, he does not universalize the solution. Rather, in a third-way
feminist manner, he identifies the systematized oppression and the particular source
of the oppression in which he must intervene, acknowledges the intersection of this
form of oppression with others, and ultimately offers individual women the choice
of agentically requesting exorcism as a solution to their trafficking situations.
While this is obviously not a legal intervention in trafficking, it does offer a
valuable model of how those who do third-way work with trafficked women offer
solutions rather than force them upon individuals. To offer a trafficked woman
access to what she believes that she needs in order to get out of trafficking, without
regard for one’s own personal beliefs in its efficacy, is to allow women space for
agentic action.
Notably, none of the interventions discussed here as third-way solutions to
trafficking forcibly removes women from trafficking situations. Instead, they
provide access to social resources that might shift the calculus that an individual
trafficked woman performs in deciding whether to run away or seek assistance in
leaving a life of trafficked sex work. These interventions demonstrate a profound
comprehension of an oppressive social system, but look to identify a particular
intervention point; they see women as individuals living under a system of
oppression and present solutions as choices to individuals, rather than externally
imposing intercessions.
Although these are only initial visions of what third-way intervention in
trafficking looks like, they differ dramatically from the “rescue” example discussed
in the Introduction. Third-way intervention is dialogical and radical. It seeks to
change society and to change the station of individual women through social
reform. It respects individual women, but offers a powerful critique of the society
in which specific women make their personal life decisions. Rather than

193. KEVIN BALES, UNDERSTANDING GLOBAL SLAVERY 131 (2005) (documenting the
occurrence of these practices within Nigerian populations of trafficked women in Italy).
194. This pastor was my supervisor during my time providing social services to Nigerian
women in southern Italy; this observation draws on my work from September 2000 until
December 2001. During my research in Thailand, I likewise observed that evangelical
Christians who offer social services to trafficked indigenous women in Thailand also
commonly offer spiritual healing at the request of their clients, who similarly believe
themselves to be under supernatural control.
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condemning individual women’s choices as unworthy of respect or demonstrative
of false consciousness when those choices increase the possibility of personal harm
and oppression to women, this third-way approach mandates constant questioning
of the context in which individuals make decisions and ongoing effort to render that
society more just and equitable, thereby increasing options for individual women. It
cannot abstract the individual from her society; neither does it consider the society
to the detriment of particular women. Third-way feminism seeks feminist change
through a combination of social critique and individual action.
IV. SYNERGIES BETWEEN THIRD-WAY FEMINIST INTERVENTIONS AND THE
CAPABILITIES APPROACH TO HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
While this Article conceptualizes trafficked women through the lens of feminist
legal theory and generates a set of interventions as the fruits of a feminist
theoretical harmonization, third-way feminist theory on trafficking likewise finds
generative force from another source. The development theory articulated by
Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, known as the capabilities approach to human
development, resonates strongly with the theory here articulated of the victimized
and yet agentic trafficked woman as an intended beneficiary of development and
human rights efforts. Although the capabilities approach found its earliest
articulations as an economic model offered by Nobel Prize–winning economist
Amartya Sen and a strain of Aristotelian thought from feminist philosopher Martha
Nussbaum, the theory of the capabilities approach to human development has
subsequently taken great hold in the arenas of public policy and political
philosophy.195
The capabilities approach to development is one particular application of the
answer that Amartya Sen proposed to the question, “[e]quality of what?”196 Unlike
many other forms of egalitarian moral reasoning that focus on strict equalities of
outcome or opportunity as the basic definition of fairness, Sen’s take on the
capabilities approach advocates equality of individual capabilities to achieve
“functionings” as the crucial dimension of distributive justice.197 Under this
conceptualization, a functioning is a part “of the state of a person—in particular the
various things that he or she manages to do or be in leading a life.”198 Functionings
might include nourishment, health, or even more complex notions such as selfrespect.199 Nussbaum presents the model slightly differently by focusing on
concrete capabilities of “what people are actually able to do and to be,”200 expressly
articulating a list of ten “central human functional capabilities”: “1) Life,” “2)
Bodily Health,” “3) Bodily Integrity,” “4) Senses, Imagination, and Thought,” “5)
Emotions,” “6) Practical Reason,” “7) Affiliation,” “8) Other Species,” “9) Play,”

195. NUSSBAUM, supra note 7, at 11.
196. Amartya Sen, Drummond Professor of Political Econ. at Oxford University,
Equality of What?: The Tanner Lecture on Human Rights at Stanford (May 22, 1979).
197. Amartya Sen, Capability and Well-Being, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 30, 30 (Martha
Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993).
198. Id. at 31.
199. Id.
200. NUSSBAUM, supra note 7, at 5.

1456

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 86:1409

and “10) Control over One’s Environment.”201 In either case, the key is not the
achievement of functionings, but rather the way that capabilities capacitate
individuals to live a variety of different kinds of lives.202 Inherent in possessing
such a set of capabilities is the freedom of an individual to envision and bring to
fruition a particular kind of life of his or her own choosing.203
Applying these basic notions to the development context, the capabilities
approach centers around a fundamental notion that the goal of development efforts
should be increasing individuals’ capacities to pursue life ends, which Sen
describes as a set of freedoms.204 Poverty, according to the capabilities approach, is
not merely the absence of goods or income, since goods are only derivative and
income is a means of attaining capabilities.205 Rather, poverty under this conception
is best understood as capability deprivation, under which individuals are
constrained in their ability to pursue the kinds of lives they value.206
Importantly, the capabilities approach does not mandate a particular set of life
choices, a matter on which both Sen and Nussbaum agree. To both theorists of the
capabilities approach, freedom to choose has intrinsic importance, since choosing is
a part of living.207 The role of the state is not to control the outcome of the choices,
but rather to equip individuals to make refined choices among functionings.208 To
demonstrate this phenomenon of individual choice, Sen distinguishes fasting from
starvation.209 While food insecurity is incompatible with the capabilities approach,
an individual who has access to sufficient food for nutritive purposes might choose
to fast for idiosyncratic reasons such as religious devotion or political principle.
This distinction is illustrative of the agnosticism of the capabilities approach, since
it permits individuals to pursue any ends of their own choice with the capabilities
they possess, while simultaneously insisting on a social goal of equipping each
individual with a set of capabilities above a threshold level.210

201. Id. at 78–80.
202. Sen, supra note 197, at 33.
203. Nussbaum is very explicit about the importance of what she announces as the
principle of each person’s capability. Under this conception, the capability of one individual
cannot be sacrificed for or subsumed into the capability of another. NUSSBAUM, supra note 7,
at 5–6, 246–47.
204. SEN, supra note 177, at 18.
205. Sen, supra note 197, at 33, 41.
206. Id. at 41–42; see also SEN, supra note 177, at 20–21.
207. Sen, supra note 197, at 39. It is worth quoting Nussbaum at length on this point:
The central capabilities are not just instrumental to further pursuits: they are
held to have value in themselves, in making the life that includes them fully
human. But they are held to have a particularly pervasive and central role in
everything else people plan and do. In that sense, too, they play a role
analogous to that of primary goods in Rawls’s recent (political-liberal) theory:
they have a special importance in making any choice of a way of life possible,
and so they have a special claim to be supported for political purposes in a
pluralistic society.
NUSSBAUM, supra note 7, at 74–75.
208. Sen, supra note 197, at 40.
209. Id.
210. NUSSBAUM, supra note 7, at 75.
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The relationship between the feminist rendition of trafficking offered here and
the capabilities approach to development and human rights work more generally
indicates the problems inherent in oversimplifying complex social phenomena that
affect the least advantaged of the global society. The capabilities approach
highlights how theorists and policy makers alike must properly comprehend the
relationship between a woman and the experience of trafficking. The third-way
feminist approach I offer provides a second framework for conceptualizing the
situation of a trafficked woman because it demands that women have meaningful
life choices. When trafficking represents a choice under circumstances of
constrained autonomy where limited alternatives are available, the capabilities
approach insists that the proper intervention is to increase individual capabilities.
Whether the choice to be trafficked is, as Sen terms one possible negative array of
options, one among a group that the individual might describe as “‘bad,’ ‘awful,’
and ‘gruesome,’”211 or is actually reflective of agentic action of choosing among
viable options is essentially impossible for the outsider to know.
What the outsider can do, however, is offer prophylactic and post-trafficking
interventions that boost the capabilities of the individual woman who is either
susceptible to trafficking or already trafficked, which are precisely the kinds of
sociolegal interventions that third-way feminist theory offers as well.212 Crucially,
both for this form of feminist thought and under the capabilities approach, the
ultimate individual choice to perform sex work is outside the realm of the proper
sites of intervention. Instead, it is by increasing the array of options available to a
particular woman that her agency is furthered and her choice might approach a
level of freedom consistent with her autonomy.213 The interventions that I propose
here set forth a model for increasing individual women’s life options, whether as a
prophylactic measure to prevent trafficking or as an intervention in trafficking
situations to assist trafficked women in accessing other life choices. Whether
microcredit, civil remedy, or caseworker privilege, all of these interventions build
the social capital that an individual woman possesses, rejecting a hegemonic,
universal solution in favor of possible interventions that contemplate the
complexity of the factors that lead a woman into a trafficking situation and keep her
there long term. These interventions are third-way feminist ones because they
address the sources of gendered power imbalances, without imposing a unitary
outcome on women, and they are consistent with the capabilities approach because
they actually increase the possibilities available to individuals.
Approaching the vignette with which this Article begins from the standpoint of
the capabilities model, we land in a place of serious concern with the initial
choosing moment in which an individual woman susceptible to trafficking assesses
her options. The capabilities approach demands that women reach that moment
with a full stock of social capital—educated, healthy from access to preventative
medical care and proper sanitation, in a nation that respects individual civil and

211. Sen, supra note 197, at 34.
212. See supra Part III.C.
213. Martha Nussbaum herself has noted the way that the capabilities approach offers a
means of resolving the feminist debate between dominance and economic (or liberal)
feminism; she posits that focusing on capabilities, both employment- and sex-related, can
move feminists beyond this theoretical schism. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 7, at 290–94.
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political rights and that offers her viable employment options. The capabilities
approach provides a proper degree of outrage when faced with women’s conditions
in Burma that render them likely to migrate for sex work. Likewise, for women
who have already found themselves in Thai brothels, the capabilities approach
suggests that preferable interventions are agnostic ones that an individual can
leverage in multiple ways to improve her living conditions. Whether framed
through the third-way feminist model or the capabilities approach, a
reconsideration of the opening vignette requires a posture towards a trafficked
person that appreciates the individual as agentic and self-determining in the face of
limitations, instead of ascribing a narrow status of victim or agent.
CONCLUSION
The promise of third-way feminism is not confined to the theoretical conflict
around the trafficking of women for sexual purposes and migration for sex work.
Feminist debates on other issues—pornography, pregnancy-related leave, sexual
harassment—could be subjected to a similar process, as Abrams suggests.214 From
a broader perspective, the general feminist dialogue on smaller, less controversial
topics is even riper for the application of a method that embraces the strengths of
polar positions. Furthermore, this kind of concretized analysis of the middle ground
between dominance and liberal feminists engages in the developing conversation
about the role of agency and constrained autonomy in the legal and philosophical
literature. The intervention model suggested here offers one suggestion of a
tangible application of this theoretical discussion.
What this model proposes is the possibility of long-term collaboration between
the two poles of feminism. Third-way feminism, applied concretely to issues of
legal justice, suggests a growing demilitarized zone, where it may be possible for
feminists who vehemently disagree about first principles to reach détente on the
possibility of interventions for the purposes of increasing women’s agency under
conditions of oppression. Furthermore, this model presents a response to the
common and wrongheaded complaint regarding critical legal theory, including
feminist theory—that it is destructive, seeking only to critique, rather than
constructively offering positive interventions. This project leverages critical
feminist insight to propose effective, targeted interventions that address real
problems facing real women.
Finally, the synergy between the conclusions that this kind of feminist legal
theorizing generates and the principles and purposes of the human capabilities
approach offers external validation of this project. At the nexus of liberal-political
philosophy, contemporary economics theory, and pragmatic efforts of international
development, the capabilities approach indicates how a focus on properly
understanding the intended beneficiary of a program can lead to interventions that
build room for the exercise of agency even under constraints. Using law and policy
to build the capabilities of individuals and communities is a worthy justice goal in
itself; that it reaffirms fundamental principles of feminist theory offers additional
justification of both modes of thought and possibilities of future scholarship as well.

214. Abrams, supra note 172, at 355.

